Why Manchester but not Hangzhou? by Zheng, Jing
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
 
       
 
   
  
  
 
 
 
MASTERARBEIT / MASTER THESIS 
 
 
 
Titel der Masterarbeit /Title of the master thesis 
Why Manchester but not Hangzhou?  
A Case Study of the State's Role in the Divergence of 
the Textile Industry in the Southern Song Dynasty and 
Britain   
 
 
Verfasser /Author 
Jing ZHENG 
angestrebter akademischer Grad / acadamic degree aspired 
Master (MA) 
Wien, 2011  
Studienkennzahl : A 067 805  
Studienrichtung:: Individuelles Masterstudium:  
Global Studies  – a European Perspective 
Betreuer/Supervisor: Univ. Prof. Dr. Peer Vries 
 
 1 
Abstract English 
 
This paper began with the description of Southern Song Hangzhou and Pre-Industrial 
Manchester, which were important textile cities in history. In the following parts, the 
paper follows the development trace of textile industry in pre-Industrial Britain and 
Southern Song. Through the comparison of these two cases, state's role in the 
divergence of textile industry in Britain and Southern Song Dynasty is discussed: In 
British case, the state influenced the domestic textile industry through the mercantilist 
policies and retreat from monopoly via guild system spontaneously. The result is the 
expansion of the market and state’s retreat from the operation or management of the 
private enterprises. This made the organizational change from domestic system to 
factory system possible before the Industrial Revolution; In Southern Song case, the 
state facilitated the market expansion and spread of technologies. Under such 
condition, Southern Song textile industry could develop at a very high technological 
level and with a very strong Smithian dynamics. However, in the rural area in where 
the proto-industrialization of Southern Song textile industry took place, the state 
maintained the two-tax system which required every household to pay large portion of 
taxes via means of textiles. Moreover, because of the serious fiscal problems, 
Southern Song state even increased the burden of tax of every household. Therefore, 
the domestic system that based on the production in household became the optimal 
option for the Southern Song textile industry. Without the strong incentives, the 
organizational change in Southern Song stagnated and finally lagged behind the 
Britain. The divergence of textile industry, as well as the fate of Hangzhou and 
Manchester then took place. With above-mentioned analyses, this paper tries to prove 
that state is a role that could not be neglected in the Great Divergence between East 
and West. 
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Abstract German 
Am Beginn dieser Arbeit stand die Beschreibung von Süd Song Hangzhou und dem 
vorindustriellen Manchester, die die beiden wichtigsten Textilstädte der Geschichte 
waren. In den folgenden Kapiteln folgt diese Arbeit den Spuren der Entwicklung der 
Textilindustrie im vorindustriellen Großbritannien und dem Südlichen Song. Durch 
den Vergleich dieser beiden Fälle wird die Rolle des Staates bei dem großen 
Auseinanderdriften der Textilindustrie in Großbritannien und der südlichen Song 
Dynastie diskutiert. Im britischen Fall beeinflusste der Staat die heimische 
Textilindustrie durch merkantilistische Politiken und gleichzeitigem Rückzug vom 
Monopolsystem über Gilden. Das Resultat ist eine Ausweitung des Marktes und der 
Rückzug des Staates vom operativen Management in privaten Unternehmen. Dies 
ermöglichte den organisatorischen Wandel vor der industriellen Revolution von einem 
häuslichen System hin zu einem Fabriksystem. Im Fall von Südlichen Song förderte 
der Staat die Expansion des Marktes und die Verbreitung von Technologie. Unter 
diesen Bedingungen konnte die Südliche Song Textilindustrie sich entwickeln und 
einen hohen technologischen Grad erreichen mit sehr starken Dynamik à la Adam 
Smith. Allerdings in den ländlichen Gebieten wo die proto-industrialisierung der 
südlichen Song Textilindustrie stattfand, unterhielt der Staat ein Zwei-Steuern System 
das von jedem Haushalt verlangte, einen großen Teil der Steuern in Form von 
Textilien abzuliefern. Dazu, wegen ernster finanzieller Probleme, erhöhte der südliche 
Song Staat die Steuerlast der Haushalte. Daher bekam das häusliche System basierend 
auf Produktion in Haushalten die optimale Form der Textilindustrie im südlichen 
Song. Ohne starke Anreize stagnierte der organisatorische Wandel im südlichen Song 
und fiel schließlich hinter Großbritannien zurück. 
Die Divergenz der Textilindustrie, als auch das Schicksal von Hangzhou und 
Manchester nahm seinen Lauf. Mit der oben erwähnten Analyse versucht diese Arbeit 
zu beweisen, dass der Staat eine nicht zu vernachlässigende Rolle im großen 
Auseinanderdriften zwischen Ost und West spielte. 
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 5 
1. Introduction  
 
It is Hangzhou, in the Emperor Gaozong’s reign (1107 A.D. -1187A.D.), years after 
the peace treaty was drawn between the Southern Song and Jin. Prior to that occasion, 
this city was taken as the capital city of the empire after the collapse of the Northern 
Song and renamed as “Lin’an” (临安), which means to settle down temporarily. The 
scourges of war led to its destitution. But, the coming peace enabled life in the city to 
revert to the days before the wars. The revival of comfortable city life made this city 
not merely a temporary harbor, whereas officials of the empire had already forgotten 
the task of restoration of lost northern territory. The high-quality life in Hangzhou was 
built on the prosperity of commercial activities and handcraft industry in the empire. 
As early as Emperor Gaozong’s reign, Hangzhou had become a place that combined 
market and manufacturing. The industrial activities in this city and nearby rural areas 
were mainly textile production, especially the manufacture of high-quality silk fabrics. 
Moreover, since Hangzhou was the location of the court, the state placed the 
government-run workshops near the city. Water frames were used to drive textile 
weaving. This sophisticated machine was second to none in the world for a long time. 
In West, a similar machine was invented by the Arkwright in the year 1767, when 
Britain had already taken its first step into the Industrial Revolution. As early as the 
beginning of the Southern Song Dynasty, Hangzhou led the Chinese textile industry to 
reach its peak. 
 
Now imagine Manchester at the beginning of the 18th century. It was still a 
medium-size town with a population of around 10,000 people. Before that, it had been 
a cloth city that combined production with trade. As early as the Elizabethan era, 
Manchester became a manufacturing and trading centre for wool and linen textiles. 
This diversified economic structure rendered this city the most prosperous place in 
Lancashire. But until the beginning of the eighteenth century, it did not gain national 
significance as it would in the Industrial Revolution era. Cotton, through which 
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Manchester attained its glory, had not yet been well-established in the Lancashire 
region. The cotton textiles that were produced in the Manchester region by the 1690s 
were cotton-linen, mainly manufactured for the domestic market. At that time, the 
quality and variety of cotton textiles in Manchester were not compatible with Britain’s 
colonies in the Indian subcontinent. This weakness of Manchester cotton textiles was 
the result of the relatively backward technologies that were utilized in the rural 
household, within which the pre-Industrialization Revolution textile manufacturing 
mainly took place. Manchester at that time was only one of the branches of newly 
expanding inland towns situated in the rural-industrial region.
1
 The picture of cotton 
textile production in the early eighteenth century was differentiated from the 
now-classic scene of mechanized cotton textile manufacturing in Industrial 
Manchester. 
 
Whether looking at the scale or technologies, the textile industry in Southern Song’s 
Hangzhou seems to have developed beyond the capacity of pre-industrial Manchester. 
It seems that at least in the textile sector, there are more possibilities for China to have 
realized an Industrial Revolution in the twelfth or thirteenth centuries. But history is 
magnificent in that there are always latecomers to surpass the old-timers. The textile 
industry in China, like Chinese empires, stagnated at the highest levels after the 
Southern Song Dynasty. The sophisticated machines, such as the water frame, were 
completely forgotten after Yuan dynasty. Before the establishment of the modern 
factory system, the quality of textiles was largely dependent on the agility and skillful 
fingers of weavers and spinners. Hangzhou nevertheless still led silk manufacturing 
within the Empire and the total volume of textile manufacturing was still large, but 
the efficiency of textile production in this city lagged far behind Manchester in the 
Industrial Revolution.  
 
In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Manchester had already become the focal 
point of the factory system in the British Isles. In 1815, Manchester’s cotton factories 
                                                        
1 Kidd 2008: 6 
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employed approximately 11,500 men, women and children. By the time of the 1841 
census, there were 19,561 working in all branches of cotton manufacture in 
Manchester.
1
 The organized textile production within the factory system and 
equipped by steam machines pushed Manchester forward as one of the significant 
industrial cities in the world. Then, divergence occured. Manchester, a small town in 
the 13th century, helped Britain to solidify its industrial supremacy over the rest of the 
world, whereas the miracle of Hangzhou turned into a legend in history books. 
 
Both Manchester and Hangzhou have been recognized for textile manufacturing. The 
fate of these two cities can be seen as epitome of fate with respect to the textile 
industry. In the following section, the textile industry in both cases will be discussed 
in order to answer one question: Why was it Manchester, and not Hangzhou, that 
ultimately stepped into the Industrial Revolution? 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Research Questions   
 
2.1 Brief Introduction to Theories of Industrialization   
To start the discussion, “industrialization” is a term that could not be neglected. This 
term is often utilized in a variety of academic discussions. It is a broad conception that 
refers to the transition of a human being’s society and mode of production. It is also 
quite an ambiguous concept, since it is hard to find a single “industrialization” model 
that could be applicable to all societies and countries. Despite this fact, within the 
field of economic historical research, historians have reached consensus on some 
basic questions. One is the division of industrialization phases in early modern 
western societies. According to Wong (1997), there were three periods of European 
industrial activities beginning in the early modern period:  
 
(1) late fifteenth to early sixteenth centuries: urban craft production; (2) mid-sixteenth 
to mid-eighteenth centuries: rural cottage industry; (3) late eighteenth century to late 
                                                        
1 Kidd 2008: 17 
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nineteenth centuries: urban factory mechanization. The shift from urban production 
controlled by crafts guilds to rural cottage industry is generally viewed as the 
liberation of production from the restriction imposed to protect producer interests; 
this becomes one sign of the breakdown of “feudal” control. The subsequent shift of 
industry back into the cities is usually seen as the triumph of the Industrial Revolution, 
which heralds the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie
1
.  
 
In the second phase, European countries emerged as the global power and built their 
industrial supremacy for more than two centuries.  
 
Classic theories of industrialization are abstracted from European experiences. 
According to Walton (1987), sociological approaches to industrialization are framed 
by two major theories: social differentiation, based on classical liberalism and 
Durkheimian sociology, and uneven development, derived from the critical work of 
Marx and Weber.
2
 The former one perceives industrialization as a process of the 
division of labor. The latter is more or less abstracted from the German experience. 
Marx focused on the process of transition to large-scale industrial production, which 
he characterized by three major tendencies: Concentration, namely the process by 
which capitalist enterprises became large as a result of the growth based on 
economies of scale
3
; Proletarianization, namely the steady decline of independent 
production and self-employment and a correlative increase in the number of wage 
laborers or workers dependent on the sale of their labor to the capitalist
4
; and also 
crisis. Weber, who was famous for his studies of the modern state, expands the notion 
through the exportation of private holders of the power: “the whole process is a 
complete parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprises through the gradual 
exploitation of the independent producer” 5 . These classical theories of 
industrialization focus on its results. Other theories tried to find out why the Industrial 
Revolution started in the West but not other places. These kinds of inquiries gave rise 
to the theories of European exceptionalism. Weberian scholars concentrated on 
                                                        
1 Wong 1997: 33 
2 Walton 1987: 89 
3 Walton 1987: 94 
4 Walton 1987: 94 
5 Walton 1987: 95 
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formulating argumentations based on cultural and spiritual reasons. Some economic 
historians tried to discover institutional merits of West European countries, such as 
New Institutional Economics, which will be mentioned later. Some of them also tried 
to found out iron and coal’s significance to industrialization, such as J. U. Nef. In 
current economic studies, the explanation of the Industrial Revolution is still a hot 
topic. For example, Robert C. Allen studies British wages in the Industrial Revolution. 
In his book, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, he argues that in 
Britain, wages were high and capital and energy cheap in comparison to other 
countries in Europe and Asia. Under such conditions, only in Britain were the 
invention and application of new machines and technologies profitable. Moreover, the 
high wages also made schooling and apprenticeships, which also fostered the 
Industrial Revolution, affordable in Britain. This theory is not as Eurocentric as 
classic arguments. Thus, during these decades, it was always utilized by historians 
who want to reinterpret history from a global perspective. Another example is Joel 
Mokyr, who concentrates on the role of knowledge in the Industrial Revolution. He 
argues that the Enlightenment Movement integrated “knowledge” into social 
development and made a free market of knowledge possible in Europe. In his work 
The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy, he introduces the 
notion of “useful knowledge”. After the Enlightenment Movement, notions and ideas 
could be discussed publicly and freely, and “useful knowledge” could be preserved. 
He also shows that through the Enlightenment Movement, access to these ideas in 
society at large also increased. In such an environment, sustainable development of 
industrialization could be ensured. In his most recent work, The Enlightened Economy: 
An Economic History of Britain 1700-1850, this theory gets further enhanced. In 
addition, the Cambridge historical team updated its Cambridge Economic History of 
Modern Britain in 2004. Volume I collected the most up-to-date research on British 
society over the period 1700-1860 when Britain led the world in the process of 
industrialization.  
 
The aforementioned theories about industrialization concentrate on society during or 
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after the Industrial Revolution. In the last century, economic historians began studying 
industrial activities before the Industrialization Revolution. As early as the 1920s, 
Paul Mantoux published his masterpiece The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth 
Century: An outline of the beginning of the modern factory system in England, in 
which he used three chapters to describe the old type of industry and its evolution, as 
well as the commercial expansion before the factory industry period. After WWII, 
research on European industrial activities threw light on industrialization even before 
the eighteenth century, with one of the most significant results being the development 
of the notion of proto-industrialization, which was fully explained in Franklin 
Mendels’s doctoral thesis. Actually, Wong’s theoretical division was based on 
Mendels’s research. Mendels described how proto-industrialization, which lasted from 
the mid-sixteenth century to the mid-eighteenth century, was the first phase of the 
industrialization process. Proto-industrialization was marked by the rapid growth of 
not only traditionally organized but also market-oriented, principally rural industry
1
. 
Although his theory has faced tremendous challenges and some aspects of this theory 
were proved to be questionable, the proto-industrialization theory not only inspired 
further research on industrialization in pre-industrial Europe, but also triggered 
research on the similar industrialization processes in the old civilizations like India 
and China.  
 
2.2 Chinese Industrialization Studies in the West.  
For a long time, research of Chinese industrialization in the West was quite 
generalized. Scholars in the West mainly had broad ideas about China’s technological 
achievement in ancient times, but seldom explored in detail. The discussion about 
Chinese endogenous industrialization began with Joseph Needham. Needham was 
famous for his work systematic research on ancient Chinese science and technology. 
Regarding China’s early achievements in science and technology but its backwardness 
after the 18
th
 century, Joseph Needham raises two questions: first, why had China 
initially been so far in advance of other civilizations; and second, why is China now 
                                                        
1 Mendels 1972: 241 
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not ahead of the rest of the world?
1
  Needham’s puzzles triggered more discussion 
about Chinese civilization and industrialization from a macro-perspective. One of the 
most significant results is Mark Elvin’s “high-level equilibrium trap” theory. This 
theory was first presented in Elvin’s The Pattern of the Chinese Past and is often 
quoted by economic historians who specialized in Chinese economic history. In his 
most recent book, Another History: Essays on China from a European Perspective, 
the theory of high-level equilibrium is mentioned again. The basic idea posits that 
because of the growing pressure of the population on arable land, the surplus product 
available for generating demand above the level of subsistence was progressively 
reduced.
2
 Finally, equilibrium was established in China between the fourteenth and 
eighteenth century. Although new farming technologies were applied, an increasing 
population ensured the existence of this equilibrium. The result of this equilibrium 
was that for long time, Chinese economy was a combination of low farm productivity 
per capita and tremendously high productivity per acre.  
 
Another very important theory used in Chinese economic historical research is 
“involution”, which was coined by Chifford Geertz in his early work Agricultural 
Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia. This notion about the 
ecological constraints in Indonesia inspired economic historians to specialize in the 
Chinese economy. In his work The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the 
Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988, Philip C. Huang utilized this notion to describe the rural 
development in the Yangzi Delta. Huang (1990) distinguished three distinguished 
patterns of agrarian growth: “first, simple intensification, in which output or output 
value expand at the same rate as labor input; second, involution, in which the total 
output expand, but at the cost of diminished marginal returns per work day; and third, 
development, in which output expands faster than labor input, to result in increase 
marginal output per workday.”3 Huang (1990) claims that the “post-revolutionary 
[meaning Mao’s communist revolution] pattern was in fact a telescoped version of 
                                                        
1 Needham 1986: 6 
2 Elvin 2007:57 
3 Huang 1990: 11 
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same pattern six century preceding the Revolution, during which agricultural output 
expanded enough to keep pace with dramatic population growth and chiefly by 
intensification, and involution. Productivity or income per Labor Day either 
stagnated, as in intensification, or shrank, as in involution.”1 Huang’s theory soon 
became a very powerful one in Chinese economic studies and in the following years, 
new theories were made to explain why intensification and involution in the 
agricultural sector influenced the industrialization process. In this context, the 
California school emerged.  
 
The California school is famous for its discussion of “the Great Divergence.” The 
Great Divergence is a term invented by Kenneth Pomeranz in his work The Great 
Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the World Economy. Pomeranz 
believes that before the 18
th
 century, there was no endogenous advantage in Europe; 
on the contrary, both the East and West were experiencing the same level of 
development. The breaking point came after the developments over the 18
th
 to 19
th
 
century when the Industrial Revolution took place in Western Europe, whereas China 
sank into the “high level equilibrium trap.” This breakpoint then was named by 
Pomeranz as the “Great Divergence.” The theories of different California school 
scholars are differentiated. However, all of their theories share the common 
presumption that before the 18
th
 century, China was wealthier and more “Smithian” 
than older generations of scholars thought. Generally, there are three such ways to 
interpret the “Great Divergence” within the California School.  The first and, I think, 
the most radical one is represented by Andre Gunder Frank, who argues that the world 
system was not as Wallerstein described in his monumental work The Modern World 
System, but rather that a Sino-dominated world system already existed before 1450. 
The second style could be represented by Kenneth Pomeranz, who attributes the 
occurrence of the Great Divergence to productivity, ecology and demography. 
Scholars with similar ideas deny that Chinese economic development in the 
pre-modern period was a non-Smithian development. In the meanwhile, they 
                                                        
1 Huang 1990: 12 
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discovered that in market aspects, the Chinese economy became even more developed 
than West Europe. Hence, they argue that the Great Divergence should be perceived 
as the result of other non-institutional factors. The third style could be regarded as 
complementary to the second one, since the research was more concentrated on 
institutional factors. The most significant scholar in this area is R.Bin Wong, who was 
famous for his research on the role of the state and taxation system in the process of 
Great Divergence. 
 
Generally speaking, the studies of Chinese industrialization in the West are strong in 
the development of invention of theories. To some degree, they even challenge the 
classic economic laws which were abstracted from Western experiences. Still, and 
very obviously, Western scholars’ research also face the problems of access to data 
and other kinds of textual research, mainly because of linguistic problems. Moreover, 
the majority of their research focuses on the Ming Dynasty, Qing Dynasty and modern 
China. As to the Song dynasty, some of the scholars mention it in their works, but 
very vaguely.  
 
2.3 Chinese Industrialization Studies in China 
Compared to Western scholars, Chinese scholars have linguistic advantages to study 
Chinese industrialization. Hence, their research on the Chinese industrialization 
process was not limited to the Ming, Qing Dynasty and Modern China. Even while 
Eurocentric perspectives were dominating Western scholarship, Chinese scholars had 
already started studies on the industrialization process in the Song Dynasty. In today’s 
Song research, Deng Guangming(邓广铭) is the scholar who cannot be neglected, 
since current Song experts in China are largely influenced by Deng’s academic 
achievement. Deng’s works about the two Song Dynasties are abundant and touch 
considerable aspects of this Dynasty, including important figures, militaries, literature, 
politics, economy, etc. In the aspects of industrialization of the Song Dynasty, the 
focal point of Deng’s works was the description of the handcraft industry, production 
relations, and urbanization that accompanied industrialization. After Deng, the study 
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of industrialization got more specialized in China. Qi Xia (漆侠), one of Deng’s 
students, is famous for his works on the Song and other contemporaneous states’, 
such as Liao, Xia and Jin’s, economic history. However, on the other hand, the 
theories utilized in this research are largely influenced by western scholarship, 
especially in the adoption of Marxist theories. Moreover, for long time, the theories of 
the “sprout of capitalism in China” dominated the economic historical research in 
post-revolutionary China. The scholars with this perspective claim that Western-like 
capitalism was already shaped in the late Ming Dynasty and, without the invasion of 
West capitalism and imperialism, Chinese endogenous capitalism would have 
developed into modern capitalism. To prove it, the scholars always exemplified the 
textile industrialization in late Ming Dynasty. The most significant scholars in this 
aspect are Xu Dixin(许涤新) and Wu Chengming(吴承明). From 1962 to 1993, they 
managed to write a complete history of Chinese capitalist history. The final result is 
The History of Chinese Capitalist Development (zhongguo zibenzhuyi fazhan shi, 中
国资本主义发展史) .In this series of books, they systematically described the 
development trace of a “sprout of capitalism in China” and also capitalism in modern 
times. After the 1970s, the notion of “proto-industrialization” was introduced into 
China and Chinese scholars soon adopted it as a suitable word to describe the Chinese 
industrialization process at the cottage level before the establishment of the modern 
factory system. The discussion of proto-industrialization in China also triggered 
Chinese scholars to ponder if it could lead causally to endogenous capitalism in terms 
of the absence of foreign invasion, since the research of proto-industrialization in 
Europe indicates that proto-industrialization did not causally led to machinized 
industrialization. 
 
Chinese scholars’ research of proto-industrialization began with the studies of the 
Yangtze Delta region in the Qing Dynasty onwards. Some scholars formed their own 
ideas about Chinese proto-industrialization theories that were different from 
traditional Marxist ones. Li Bozhong (李伯重) is the most representative Chinese 
economic historian after the Mao era. He is also regarded as a member of the 
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“California School” since his non-Eurocentric perspective was similar to the 
California School scholars. He claims that although China did well from a market and 
division of labor perspective in pre-modern times, its pattern of growth was totally 
different from the British case. Li claims that Chinese economic growth in that period 
was more Smithian, meaning that the Chinese economy was growing via the division 
of labor and specialization of regions. Because of Smithian dynamics, the market was 
inevitably developed. By contrast, he British economic increase was closer to 
“Kunznetsian Growth” in that its growth dynamics after the Industrial Revolution 
were mainly generated from technological ruptures. With this idea, Li discovered 
some historical facts that are easily neglected. His most important discovery was the 
“ultra-light structure” of the Chinese proto-industrialization economy in the Yangtze 
Delta. “Ultra-light structure” is the term invented to describe the industrial structure 
that heavily relies on the booming of light industry. Li argues that compared to the 
British case, proto-industrialization in the Yangtze Delta suffered from this structure 
and could not develop an iron and coal industry, which he regards as a determinant in 
Britain’s transformation from Smithian growth to the Kunznetsian Growth. Ge 
Jinfang (葛金芳), one of the major Song experts in China, is famous for his studies on 
the Song handcraft industry. In the conclusion part of his History of South Song 
Handcraft Industry (nansong shougongye shi 南宋手工业史), he indicates that 
proto-industrialization in the Southern Song Dynasty was also developing an 
“ultra-light structure”. Ge also has the opinion that the incapability of 
proto-industrialization in the Southern Song Dynasty to upgrade from “Smithian” to 
“Kutznetian” growth was because of this uneven economic structure. Obviously, Li 
and Ge’s theories aim at to challenging the traditional Eurocentric methodologies in 
Chinese economic history. Some other significant Chinese historians outline similar 
perspectives. Bao Weimin(包伟民), who is famous for his works on the financial and 
urban history of the Song Dynasty, always implores scholars to study Chinese things 
in a Chinese context. In the case of industrialization, he believes that even in the time 
when Chinese industrialization was exposed to Western ideas, Chinese 
industrialization did not follow the European model, namely that industrialization 
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soon transferred to urban regions when it got mechanized, whereas industrialization in 
the rural areas played a very important role. He believes that the differences were 
generated from the peculiar demographic structure and way of business in China. 
 
Moreover, some Chinese scholars insist that cultural and institutional disadvantages 
render the proto-industrialization process stagnated. For example, Justin Yifu Lin 
(1992) points out the divergence of Chinese and British industrialization that was 
generated from different ways of technological invention. His hypothesis is that China 
was an early leader in all things technical because of the large population, which 
could generate a large number of inventions based on practical experiences. China fell 
behind the West in modern times because China did not make the shift from the 
experience-based process of invention to the experiment-cum-science-based invention, 
while Europe did so through the Scientific Revolution in the sixteenth century.
1
  
 
2.4 State and Industrialization 
There are plenty variables that influence the industrialization process.  In almost 
every successful case of industrialization, the state’s role could not be neglected. The 
economic historian already tends to compare the different patterns of industrialization 
between China and European countries in the context of the state. However, research 
on the states and endogenous proto-industrialization are still limited. According to 
Wong (1997),  
 
the Chinese state aimed for and to some degree achieved its goal of static efficiency, 
that is, spreading the best techniques available across a vast area. This goal made 
sense within a world of limited possibilities. European, in contrast, sought 
competition and growth. Though they didn’t anticipate the possibilities that came the 
possibilities that came with the Industrial Revolution, their attitudes helped them to 
develop systems to exploit those possibilities more swiftly and effectively than could 
happened in China.
2
 
 
                                                        
1 Lin (1992): 11 
2 Wong 1997: 280 
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Wong’s conclusion was drawn on the basis of his studies on the different path of state 
formation in Europe and China. However, his analysis stops there. As to how the 
“static efficiency” was shaped, the answer is not mentioned in his works. But Wong’s 
research at least indicates a fact: different types of state offer industry different 
incentives.  
 
But research on Western economic history has already deeply explored this topic. The 
emergence of the field of institutional economics is the best example. Initially, 
institutional economics did not formulate a theoretical system. Early institutional 
economists had various research orientations, though all of their research emphasized 
the role of non-market factors in economic activities, such as law, history, society, and 
ethics. After WWII, differentiation took place within this school and it developed into 
the New Institutional Economic School. Over 40 years of development, New 
Institutional Economics has already constructed its own theoretical framework. 
Douglass C. North is the representative figure of this theoretical innovation. North 
successfully introduced New Institutional Economic approaches into historical 
research on Europe and America. Based on European and American experiences, he 
concludes that the role of the state promotes economic change. From his perspective, 
the state offers two basic services: one is the ability to define property rights and the 
other is to reduce transaction costs within such a property right structure so that social 
products get maximized. The first service triggers monopolies, which are against the 
basic aim of second service. The success of the British Industrial Revolution is 
because monopoly was controlled and private property rights were protected. Under 
such conditions, the profits and rights of private enterprises were protected from state 
intervention. Without the intervention of the state, organizational change at the 
enterprise level could occur more easily at the end of proto-industrialization. For the 
Industrial Revolution, organizational changes in enterprises occurred prior to 
technological change. In this sense, the British state, which administered the 
institutions to protect property rights, was a crucial factor driving Industrial 
Revolution. 
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New Institutional Economics became quite popular in Chinese academies and 
policy-making from the 1980s. Recent developments over the past thirty years’ have 
shown the benefits of the institutional change after reforms in 1978. But most research 
focuses on the macro-level, seldom touching the details of particular sectors. This 
paper will take the textile industries in the Southern Song Dynasty and pre-Industrial 
Revolution Britain (England), an industry that profoundly influenced the destinies of 
Hangzhou and Manchester respectively, as the objectives of comparison, discussing 
how two different types of state affected the textile industries in each case. 
 
3. Textile Industry and State: pre-industrial Britain (England) 
 
Although the Industrial Revolution in Britain is symbolized by the mechanization of 
the cotton textile sector, the traditional textile industry in Britain is for wool. Wool 
textile even existed in the prehistoric Britain isles. But before the rise of 
proto-industrialization, Britain was on the periphery of the European trade system and 
largely lived on the export of wool, rather than wool textile. In federalist England, the 
wool tax was a crucial source of traditional feudal revenues. North and Thomas (1973) 
pointed out that the state’s revenue was made up chiefly of wool tax. This custom 
alone yielded ￡30,000 a year by the later fifteenth century1. At the same time, the 
handcraft industry on the European continent was booming.  Wool textile production 
on the continent, especially in Flanders, was threatening the weak wool textile 
manufacturing industry in the British Isles. At the beginning, the wool industry in the 
British Isles, with its backward technology, was not compatible with that on the 
European continent. Only until to the end of proto-industrialization did Britain 
become the major wool textile exporter in Europe. From a raw-material exporter to a 
principal woolen-manufacture exporter, proto-industrialization was the key to this 
great change of Britain (England). From the mid-sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth 
century, the wool textile industry dominated the proto-industrialization process in the 
                                                        
1 North and Thomas 1973: 83 
 19 
British Isles. Before cotton textile production emerged as a major textile industrial 
activity, wool textile also dominated the export market in Britain. Total yearly 
production of wool textile was probably worth about ￡8-9 million, while exports 
averaged ￡4-5 million a year over the decade, so that some 50 to 60 percent of 
output was exported. This represented 52 percent of the official value of domestic 
exports, or 35 percent if re-exports are added.
1
 Considering the importance of the 
wool textile industry for Britain, my study on the British textile industry will therefore 
begin with the wool textile industry and focus on the shift from the wool textile 
industry to cotton textile industry. 
 
3.1 Wool textile industry and the beginning of British (English) 
proto-industrialization 
The history of industrial activities relating to wool textile in Britain is longer than the 
proto-industrial revolution. In the Middle Ages, the production of wool textile in 
England was already underway, mainly for self-sufficiency but it was partly 
commercialized. At the end of the seventh century, England was making woolen cloth 
as an ordinary commodity for local communities. By the second half of the eighth 
century, there is clear evidence that English wool was exported to the Continent.
2
 As 
early as the beginning of proto-industrialization, the wool textile industry was a 
leading handcraft industry in the British rural area. From the mid-sixteenth to the 
mid-eighteenth century, the location of wool textile production changed. At the 
beginning of proto-industrialization England, the principal rural textile-manufacturing 
regions were the West Country, East Anglia, West Yorkshire and the Kent Wald. By 
the eve of the Industrial Revolution, the four main wool textile areas were East Anglia, 
the West country, the South-West and the West Riding of Yorkshire; there were also 
some lesser woolen areas, viz. the Shropshire-Welsh border zone, the Westmorland 
industry centered around Kendal, the southern area embracing the Kentish Weald and 
parts of Surrey, Berkshire, and Hampshire, as well as a scattered central area covering 
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manufacturing in and around such towns as Coventry, Northampton and Lincoln.
1
 It 
is clear that the major wool textile regions were in the pastoral regions, or more 
precisely, in the so-called wood-pasture regions. The British historian Joan Thirsk was 
famous for her distinctive contribution to British agrarian history, having performed 
deep research on the early industries in the English countryside. Her representative 
work in this topic is her Industries in the Countryside, whose main discovery is that 
the English industry in the countryside was formed in the pastoral areas. This 
discovery was based on her comprehensive studies on the early industries in typical 
proto-industrialized areas. In the case of the West England, she finds that the early 
cloth-making industry was in the dairy industry areas. This situation did not change 
until the agricultural revolution. In the east part of England, Thirsk found a similar 
phenomenon. The availability of a local supply of wool was the obvious reason for 
the booming of the wool textile industry in the pastoral area. However, the availability 
of material is only a sin qua non to the prosperity of industry.  Historians have done 
comprehensive research on the relationship between British proto-industrialization 
and the country’s pastoral area. Some theories emphasize the different seasonality of 
farming and husbandry. Compared to the former, the latter is less influenced by the 
change of the seasons and thus people involved in it would have much more free time 
to devote to  wool textile production Some  historians emphasize  demographic 
pressure in the pastoral region while much more copious and significant research 
focuses on social reasons. The current research on British (English) 
proto-industrialization indicates that the pre-existing structure of landholding, 
inheritance customs and relatively weak seigniorial control in the Wood-pasture were 
basic reasons for the proto-industrialization of wool textile production in these areas. 
According to Zell (1994),  
 
wood-pasture regions were often late-settled districts, where both landlords’ power 
and manorial authority had always been weak, compared with earlier settled 
lowlands. In wood-pasture regions, landholding structures were characterized by 
large number of freeholders or tenants with copyholds of inheritance and low, fixed 
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rent. In many of these districts farms had always been enclosed, with little or no 
collective controls over farming. In addition, the typical customs of inheritance in 
these districts were partible and holdings were often easily alienated or leased out. 
There was often little or no seigniorial control over settlement and therefore such 
regions became the destination of poor migrants from lowland regions where 
household formation was more rigorously controlled by landlords and manorial 
juries.
1
 
 
There is no single reason that could explain how the proto-industrialization of wool 
textile production in the wood-pasture region happened, however Zell (1994)’s 
interpretation at least points out a fact: in the region where wool textile production 
became proto-industrialized, federal control was not as strong as in other regions.  
 
Here another question arises: what does “federal control” exactly means? Actually, it 
was a tradition that was adopted from the Middle Ages.  As early as in the Middle 
Ages wool trade was taken as the main source of English feudal revenue. The Crown 
monopolized the wool trade through granting monopoly power to specialized guilds 
in the urban areas. Prior to the proto-industrialization era, the industrial activities 
mainly took place in cities, although the cities at that time were primarily geared 
toward mercantilism rather than for production. According to North and Thomas 
(1993), the early specialization that generated from larger markets eventually 
developed into the occupational guilds. “These medieval guilds purchased from the 
existing coercive power (the Crown, a major lord or the town burgesses) the exclusive 
right to practice a certain trade within a given region.”2 Buying the legal rights from 
the Crown and major lords, the member of these guilds stood together to loan the 
working capital, set the standards of quality and sometimes restrict the quantity of 
outputs. This phenomenon could be seen throughout the whole of Western Europe 
during the high Middle Ages and continued into the early modern era. The degree of 
the specialization of guilds even increased with the division of labor in the urban 
industries. 
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The guild system exerted both negative and positive effect on England’s infant textile 
industry. In fact, indigenous textile production in the British Isles was backwards prior 
to proto-industrialization. However, guilds helped in the attraction of skillful Flemish 
immigrants, who came from a relatively advanced textile production region; the 
technologies they brought to the British Isles strongly stimulated the thriving of the 
English wool textile industry.  Similar phenomenon could also be seen in cotton 
textile production, which will be mentioned later.  Immigration from Flanders was 
the key factor of the birth of the English cotton textile industry. In short, the positive 
effects of guilds or monopolists were mainly embodied in the introduction of new 
textile technologies. However, the domestic guilds were regarded as negative because 
of their strict regulation. The English guilds of weavers existed in the larger textile 
towns before 1150
1
. Getting support from the coercive powers, they became more 
concentrated upon producing for local markets. The direct result was to force textile 
production to retreat from urban areas. Unregulated wood-pasture areas became its 
destination. In this sense, the spontaneous emergence of the wool textile industry in 
the countryside was a result of avoiding the influence of the federalist state. 
 
In the less- restricted wood-pasture region, it was easier for the organizational change 
to take place. Zell points out that this change took place in the framework which, in 
his words, is the “domestic form” of production organized by men with capital.2 
Capital was mainly from a special person who was titled as “clothier”, whereas men, 
or laborers, were mainly from rural households. “The clothiers ‘put out’ their raw 
materials to independent craftsmen and women who processed them in their own 
homes, most of the processes of manufacture took place away from the workshops of 
the clothier, and where carried out by spinners, weavers, fullers and shearmen on their 
own equipment.” 3  From this description it is clear that at beginning of 
proto-industrialization, the clothier had already emerged as the hub of textile 
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production. They owned the capital and, usually, also the tools. The production relied 
largely on rural households. This kind of framework ensured the development of wool 
textile manufacturing throughout the whole sixteenth century, until its long, slow 
decline in the seventeenth century. Zell names this mode of production as domestic 
form, whereas a more well-known term to describe this kind of system is “domestic 
system”.   
 
3.2 Further development of wool textile manufacturing, mercantilism and the 
state  
The development of wool textile manufacturing kept its pace in the seventeenth- and 
early eighteenth-century British Isles. Compare to the continental countries such as 
France and Flanders, urbanization was not the precondition for proto-industrialization 
in Britain. For example, as late as the eve of the Industrial Revolution, wool textile 
production in Yorkshire still remained at the rural household level. According to 
Hudson (1996), it is estimated that,  
 
it took six people to make a piece of broadcloth in the eighteenth century, many west 
Yorkshire households were of this size, additional adults being taken on as 
journeymen or apprentice within a house hold where men, women and children 
worked together as an independent production unit, buying raw wool from staplers 
and selling unfinished cloths at weekly cloth markets in Leeds and elsewhere. In the 
Yorkshire, worsted sector whole families were sometimes involved in textile 
manufacture but individuals were often employed for separate processes: females 
mainly on spinning and men, predominantly, on weaving or combing) by different 
employers.
1
  
 
We see that in the middle phase of proto-industrialization, the division of labor within 
the domestic system became more sophisticated. The increasing of division of labor 
stimulated the output of wool textile manufactures. Not only did the volume of 
production increase, but more labor- and capital-intensive woolen textiles were also 
on the rise, such as colored, worsteds half-worsteds and new draperies.  Worsteds 
were  woolen textiles that were made by combing wool only, such as beds, buffins, 
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camlets, durants, etc;  half-worsteds were  new stuffs or  draperies in the wider 
sense, made of combed warp and carded weft, such as baize, druggets, Exeter long 
ells, perpetuanas, etc; new draperies, in the strict sense, were those slight stuffs made 
by  combing wool and silk and/ or mohair and/ or vegetable cotton, such as alapeens, 
antherines, bombazines, silk druggets, etc.
1
 
 
In turn, more labor- and capital-intensive wool textile manufacturing demanded an 
enhanced role of the clothier, who organized labor and owned the capital that 
circulated in the domestic system of textile production. Big clothiers were emerging 
in such a context. Fowler did a case study on the wool industry in Yorkshire and 
pointed out that the model of the “big clothier” reflected the later development of 
worsted production in Yorkshire and the need to mobilise large capital in order to 
compete with the traditional producers of East Anglia
2
. Based on Heaton and 
Hudson’s researches, he also pointed out that,  
 
the clothier in worsted employed substantial numbers of wage workers compared with 
his counterpart in woollen textiles. The clothier purchased the raw material which 
was put out to workers in their homes. The clothier retained ownership of the raw 
material as well as the finished product and he then sold on the goods to the 
merchant. According to Heaton, worsted was ‘much more capitalistic’ than woollen 
textiles and the clothier therefore enjoyed higher levels of profit than his counterpart 
in woollen textiles.
3
  
 
Although the scene of British textile production at that time was still quite different 
from that of the typical factory production in the Industrial Revolution, the domestic 
system organized by the big clothiers ensured the steady development of wool textile 
manufacturing. The rising productivity of a big wool textile industry changed the 
structure of the British (English) economy. During the proto-industrialization era, 
domestic demand was not the main dynamic for textile production, as half of exports 
were supported by the wool textiles.  
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Besides the evolution the mode and relationships of production, the wool industry in 
seventeenth century Britain (England) also improved on the account of more 
advanced textile technologies. Especially, the emerging new textile industry largely 
stimulated technical innovation in Stuart and early Hannover Britain (England). What 
needs to be noted is that in the whole of the seventeenth century, the invention of 
machines for wool textile manufacturing did not take place; it was not until the 
invention of the flying shuttle in 1733 that a machine specifically for the 
manufacturing of wool was invented. Throughout proto-industrialization, 
technological improvements in wool textile production were due to the deepening 
division of labor and workers’ improved skills. In that era, the workers in the wool 
textile industry were specialized in such processes as carding, roving, combing, 
spinning, weaving, burling, fulling and the finishing process. Of these, spinning and 
weaving were together the core process of production. The spinning was carried out 
with a hand wheel, which gave motion to the spindle by means of revolving wheel.
1
 
The quality of the weft that was produced with this simple machine was largely 
dependent on the finger skills of its spinners. The weaving process was carried out in 
the loom, which was framed like an oblong box, with four upright posts being joined 
together by two long and two short posts
2
. The first task of the weaver was to arrange 
the warp in order on the loom. This was termed as “looming”, and unless the warp 
was “put square” (fixed properly) on the loom, meaning every thread was at an equal 
tension, the texture of the cloth may have been uneven.
3
 When the warp was prepared, 
the waver seated himself at the loom and, with his foot, depressed the right treadle.
4
 
The weaving operations that followed were opening alternate sheds in the warp by 
means of the treadles; casting the shuttle through the sheds when opened; and driving 
home the weft threads with the batten. 
5
  Weaving with this kind of simple machine 
required high personal skills on the part of the weaver.  
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For countries in the northwest corner of continental Europe, however, the 
above-mentioned technologies were not uncommon. People who performed as 
clothiers also could be seen in France, Flanders, etc. No matter the technology or 
organization of production, Britain (England) did not have obvious endogenous 
advantages. The legend of wool textile in pre-industrial Britain would have to be 
made by other means. 
 
As mentioned above, the bulk wool textile made in Britain was exported to the 
European continent, since the domestic British market could not consume the 
increasing outputs of wool textile manufacture. Thus, the expansion of foreign 
markets constituted a vital reason for the progress of wool textile manufacturing in 
proto-industrialization. At the same time, the expansion of Britain’s foreign markets 
was accompanied by the shift of the hub of the world capitalist system from the 
Netherlands to Britain. During this process, the forming nation-state of the British 
Isles was by no means a negligible factor in the area’s economic development. It is 
this very phenomenon that the rise of the nation-state in Western Europe was 
accompanied by the rise of mercantilism, and Britain was no exception. Actually, 
even before the Britain was unified, mercantilism had already come into the speeches 
of the Crown and the big lords. In Tudor Britain, mercantilism was embodied in the 
state’s intervention in the areas of credits, trade protection and bullions. Through the 
Glorious Revolution and the enhancement of the new capitalist class’s power in the 
House of Commons in the mid-seventeenth century, British mercantilism experienced 
a change which lifted the position of trade in the national economy. Later British 
mercantilism was represented by Thomas Mum’s epoch-making work, England’s 
Treasure by Foreign Trade. In this monumental work, Mum tried to provide the state 
with such kinds of ideas: first, ensuring the state’s trade surplus via developing 
domestic industry on the one hand and increasing shipping business to expand foreign 
trade on the other, especially with the colonies; the second was economic expansion 
through a monopoly of trade in the area and with the colonies. The latter strategies 
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were obviously to counter against the Netherland’s supremacy in European trade and 
the long distance trade with the colonies. In this pamphlet, Mum repeatedly 
mentioned the dilemma British industries were facing with the Netherland’s 
supremacy in the distant trade, including the ascendant domestic wool textile industry. 
Mum’s mercantilism provoked the state’s enthusiasm to compete with United 
Provinces on the seas. The result was the state’s direct intervention to protect the 
domestic market. Actually, in the expansion of pre-industrial British (English) foreign 
markets, Britain (England) eventually developed into a fiscal-military state. 
Proto-industrialization and the first Industrial Revolution mainly took place in such a 
framework. Through this method of protectionism, the English state realized the first 
“import-substitution” in Europe, which largely enhanced the power of its domestic 
industries in the world capitalist system. Rome was not built in a day; the expansion 
of foreign markets and protection of the domestic market was realized eventually. 
Before the rise of laissez fair, the British (English) state spent around a half century 
constructing its trade supremacy in a mercantilist structure.  
 
The first important state action was the enactment of the Navigation Acts. The 
Navigation Acts came into force in October 1651, and were further modified in 1663, 
1673, and 1696. These mercantilist acts finally expired in 1854, when the British 
state’s strategy shifted to the improvement of free trade worldwide. The main aim of 
these acts was to ensure that colonial development was favorable to England, and stop 
direct colonial trade with the Netherlands, France and other European countries. What 
needs to be noted is that Scotland and Ireland were both initially included into this 
series of laws; however, after 1707, Ireland was excluded from the Navigation Acts. 
According to the Navigation Acts of 1660, ships from continental Europe, as few 
other international carriers then existed, were excluded, “(1) from the import and 
export trade of the English colonial possessions in Asia, Africa, and America; (2) from 
importing into England the goods of the foreign parts of those continents; (3) from the 
English coastwise trade; and (4) certain restrictions were thrown about the 
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importation into England of Europe.” 1  The enactment of the Navigation Acts 
tremendously challenged Dutch interests on the seas. In the case of textiles, the export 
of textiles from the Netherlands to the British Isles was shrinking sharply. This 
certainly provoked the United Provinces’ antagonism. Thus, the famous three 
Anglo-Dutch Wars took place in the years of 1652, 1664 and 1672, respectively. 
England’s success broke the United Province’s predominance on the seas and realized 
quasi-monopoly in the ocean trade. This change increased the transition cost of 
importing textiles from the European continent to the British Isles. In such a condition, 
the Dutch products’ advantage of price was mitigated by the British supremacy on the 
ocean. On the other hand, the transition costs of domestic products which were 
exported to the continent were minified. This rendered the British wool textile more 
competitive in foreign markets in the aspect of price. Although the technologies 
distance could not be shortened overnight, the mitigation of price distance did enlarge 
the breathing room of the British wool textile industry before the Industrial 
Revolution. In fact, not only wool textiles, but also other textiles such as linen and 
cotton were also beneficiaries of Britain’s success; these textiles, though, were not 
significant for the British (English) export market during that time.  
 
The British state’s mercantilist policies that reduced the domestic industries’ transition 
cost are not only embodied in the state’s protectionism against its foreign rivals. Even 
on its overseas colonies the state set regulations to meet domestic interests. A perfect 
example is the ban on the import of calicoes by the British East India Company. This 
movement in parliament was initiated by the woolen and silk interests in the British 
Isles. The direct reason for this protectionist ban was the sharply increasing volume of 
calicoes imported from Asia at the second half of 17
th
 century. Actually, cotton cloth 
had been sold in the British Isles even before the establishment of the East India 
Company in 1600. At the beginning, the quantity of cotton textile that was imported 
by the East India Company remained small and could not challenge the domestic 
wool textile industry. The situation changed, though, when the East India Company 
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set deep roots in India. According to O’Brien (1991), by the 1660s their (calicoes 
imported by the East India Company) total value exceeded Chinese silks and at the 
end of the seventeenth century calicoes accounted for about one-quarter of all textiles 
imported to England.
1
 In 1700 this sector’s gross output (of woolens, linens, silks, 
cottons, and mixed textiles) may have amounted to £8.5 million, of which £4.5 
million (mainly woolen cloth) was exported.
2
 Although England at that time was a 
net exporter in general, the interests of the wool textile industry still noticed the 
encroaching danger from the inflows of Indian calicoes. England’s native woolen and 
silk interests first became politically active against Asian textiles as early as the 1670s, 
but agitation to prohibit the consumption of imported calicoes and wrought silk only 
became serious in the mid-1690s.
3
 From that point on, the British (English) 
government continually responded to the pressure by taxing and setting quotas for the 
East India Companies to sell calicoes in Eastern Markets. In the year of 1721, an 
effective protectionist regulation on Asian textiles imported by the East India 
Company was passed by parliament. Although it was the British (English) woolen and 
silk interests that started this parliamentary protection against the British colonial 
power of trade, historians point out that the cotton industry was the largest beneficiary. 
This will be mentioned in next part of this paper. However, the struggle of wool 
textile interests in parliament did increase its domestic market share (with Asian 
textiles nibbling at its dominance before the ban), albeit the principal market of 
British (English) wool textile still was overseas. 
 
In such a way, the state’s mercantilism exerted a positive effect on both its foreign and 
domestic markets. At the peak of the sixteenth century’s wool textile industry, about 
80-90 percent of exports from London were of woolen cloth.
4
 
 
Expansion of the market did facilitate the upgrading of the British (English) textile 
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industry, but this could not causally lead to the Industrial Revolution. The evidence is 
that market expansion also appeared in Qing China, although Chinese 
proto-industrialization in the Qing Dynasty did not lead to British-like 
Industrialization. In this sense, the expansion of the market only constituted a 
necessary condition for the evolution of British industrialization to Industrial 
Revolution, rather than a sufficient condition. There were also other dynamics for the 
upgrade of British industrialization.  
 
Historians name the eighteenth century as the “long eighteenth century” for the 
abundant and comprehensive changes that occurred during it, which shaped the world 
and civilization in later centuries. The seventeenth century, which was characterized 
by proto-industrialization, was not as marvelous as its successor, yet it was the very 
century with tremendous political changes in the British Isles which laid the 
cornerstone of the eighteenth century’s legend. In general, with these political changes, 
the power of the crown was declining. Companying this change, the Crown’s 
monopoly of the domestic market via guilds was also shrinking. As mentioned 
previously, proto-industrialization in the wood-pasture area was a result of the guild’s 
monopoly, which was granted by the Crown and the big lords in the urban areas. The 
absolute control over tax, which was achieved by the Tudor Dynasty, was also the aim 
of the Stuart Dynasty. Although mercantilism was adopted by the Crown at that time, 
it was really only taken as an effective way to increase the wealth of the Crown and 
the big lords, and so the monopolies which were in favor of the Crown were not given 
up. The breaking point was appearing in the conflict between the government and the 
Crown. According to North and Thomas, the Crown, caught up in the expensive 
rivalry between nations, needed more revenues and parliament proved intractable. 
The Crown viewed the government as its prerogative, the parliament saw the Crown 
as circumscribed by the common law
1
. The Crown and parliament essentially 
competed in issues regarding the monopolies. Initially, the Crown’s power was strong 
enough to maintain the monopoly. However, in the late Tudor dynasty, the rise of the 
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House of Commons, which was dominated by the emerging merchant class and land 
owners, changed the balance of power between the Crown and parliament. North and 
Thomas (1973) highlight Sir Edward Coke’s contribution to the early parliamentary 
opposition to the Crown’s monopolistic power. Coke and his group advocated the 
supremacy of common law over the development of commercial law, insisting that 
special monopolistic privileges associated with the Crown’s prerogative should be 
revoked according to the spirit of common law. The direct result was the enactment of 
the Statues of Monopolies in 1624. This law ended the Crown’s absolute control over 
commercial activities. Thus, the barriers that the early proto-industrialized wool 
textile production suffered were removed through a juridical way.  Commercial and 
trade interests began to dominate the government as the Crown’s power declined. This 
tendency was enhanced through the succeeding political transition throughout the 
whole seventeenth century. Through the decline of the Crowns monopoly, the guild 
system in England finally broke down at the beginning of seventeenth century, 
thereby expanding the space for the possible change in business and industrial 
organizations. In the case of the wool textile industry, the capital from the urban areas 
began to flow into the countryside and triggered the emergence of big clothiers. 
During the seventeenth century, according to Lipson (1965),  
 
the number of persons employed by a clothier naturally varied considerably. Some 
clothiers employed 150 or even 200weavers…In addition to the wavers the clothier 
has in his employment a large number of burlers, carders, spinners, cloth-finishers, 
and others; thus a wealthy clothier might employed altogether as many as 800 
persons and even more. It is evident, that capitalist employer was already the 
outstanding figure in the woollen industry long before the Industrial Revolution.
1
 
 
Based on such a condition, these big clothiers were the first group of people who 
tended to organize production in a particular location that was equipped by machines 
and required a relatively large number of laborers. This could be seen as the 
preparation for the rise of the modern factory system. Early economic historians 
specialized in the study of proto-industrialization maintain the opinion that 
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proto-industrialization in Britain formed the basis of entrepreneurship in England, and 
the later factory-owners were exposed to the influence of this great change. For 
example, at the late stage of British (English) proto-industrialization, some of the 
clothiers in the West Country and Yorkshire employed men in their own weaving 
sheds, thus creating a miniature factory.
1
 The miniature factory that derived from the 
domestic system contained advantages that the domestic system did not have. 
According to Lipson (1965), “the advantages of the system were threefold. It enabled 
the employer to supervise in person the processed of manufacture; it prevented delay 
in the return of the work, which was wont to occur when a weaver wove in his own 
home for different masters; and it rendered more difficult any embezzlement if the 
raw material.
2” Within this miniature framework, the division of labour and the level 
of specialization of the wool textile region were further deepened. More significantly, 
the clothiers’ management skills were sharply improved. The betterment of 
management integrated the processes of wool textile manufacture. This change not 
only brought the improvement of production efficiency, but also the reduction of 
transition costs generated from scattered production processes in the domestic system. 
In turn, these improvements rendered wool textile from the British Isles more 
competitive in the face of challenge from the European continent and Asia. But what 
needs to be noted is that this kind of miniature factory system did not widely apply to 
the whole wool textile industry. The late-comers, such as the cotton and silk industries, 
were inspired by it and established the first several modern factories in the British 
Isles. 
 
To sum up, from the early seventeenth century to the early eighteenth century, 
technology in Britain (England) improved and eventually caught up with the 
northwest corner of the European continent. The main dynamic of industrial 
development was the expansion of markets, both domestic and foreign. At the same 
time, the English state experienced a transformation from medieval to modern nation 
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state. The strengthening of the central government increased protectionism up as the 
will of a nation. The state provided the wool textile industry the protection to realize 
import-substitution. Moreover, expansionary military actions largely reduced the 
transition costs that were generated from Holland’s supremacy of the seas. After 1707, 
the unification of the United Kingdom removed barriers within the British Isles. The 
internal unification of politics and markets focused the protectionism of the state only 
against the European continent and the colonies. No matter the revised Navigation 
Acts or the ban of Asian textiles imported by the East India Company, all of these 
state actions were aimed at the successful competition of British goods in foreign 
markets. The expansion of markets provided the manufacturing stimulus and 
increased the division of labor and specialization of the wool textile production region. 
The rise of the big clothier could be seen as the result of this tendency. Market 
expansion and the increasing division of labor were the main dynamics of 
development during this period. All of this was strongly related to the mercantilism 
which was prevalent in the British Isles.  
 
Taking political and social factors in pre-industrial Britain into account, however, 
mercantilism alone could not have ensured that the state would always play a positive 
role in industrial development. The types of mercantilism characterized by 
protectionism were not British inventions, as the West European countries in the 
seventeenth century also developed their own mercantilism.  In Spain and France, 
though, mercantilism did not generate such positive results as in England. In the case 
of Britain (England), the Crown and parliament both tried to exert direct influence on 
the central government. At the beginning, the Crown gained the upper hand. With the 
Crown’s influence, the government continued the monopoly that was adopted from 
the Middle Ages via the guild system and industrial regulations in the urban areas as a 
main source of income outside of taxes. If the guild system and the Crown’s industrial 
regulation did not decline in the seventeenth century, we could not define the wool 
textile industry’s prosperity in terms of mercantilism, since the booming of wool 
textile production largely depended on big clothiers whose capital was mainly from 
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the urban region, where guilds were in control. But the long seventeenth century was 
long for its considerable social and political changes. The waxing of the House of 
Commons and the waning of the Crown’s power made this medieval tradition end 
with the Statute of Monopolies. Common law then began to rule industrial regulation, 
rather than the will of the Crown. Under the rule of common law, the emerging new 
mercantilists had access to participation in the formulation of state policies. The rising 
new capitalists then enjoyed the power of speeches in the parliament. In the 
seventeenth century, wool textile manufacturing was not only a way of life for 
households in the wood-pasture region; it had also become an honorable business. 
Thus some of the parliament members were big clothiers, and some big families 
developed from the big clothiers. According to Lipson (1965),  
 
in the seventeenth century, a Member of Parliament told the House of Commons that 
he and his partner maintained above three thousand workman; and in the eighteenth 
century Daniel Defoe related that he was told at Bradford in Wiltshire “that it was no 
extraordinary thing to have been originally raised from and built by this truly noble 
manufacture.
1
 
 
Hence, the British (English) experience was the combination of export-oriented 
mercantilism and the decline of domestic monopoly. Both of these two state actions 
offered incentives to the wool textile industry: export-oriented mercantilism offered 
wool textile production the incentive to fulfill the expanded market, and the decline of 
domestic monopoly endued the wool textile industry with a relatively free domestic 
environment to develop at its own will. Both of these state’s actions were the result of 
competition. The former was the result of the competition with other European 
countries; the latter was the fruit of the competition between the new capitalist class 
and the declining Crown’s power. In other European countries at that same time, none 
were able to also be successful in both competitions. Hence, they could not largely 
reduce transition costs both domestically and overseas as Britain (England) did in the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Though the wool textile industry did not help 
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Britain to achieve its glories as the cotton industry did, since it was the leading 
industry during that time, the changes the state made under the influence of the wool 
textile industry did profoundly affect the development track of other textile industries.   
 
3.3 The rise of cotton textile industry and the state 
Also because of competition, the supremacy of British (English) wool textile in 
exports did not last for long. Although the absolute volume of British (English) wool 
textile readily increased during last decades of the seventeenth century, the peak of 
wool textile export took place in 1660s. The relative decline of wool textiles could be 
seen as a result of constant wars, but the rise of other products in foreign markets was 
also a crucial factor. Since trade of British (English) wool textile was mainly with 
other European countries, it was facing fierce competition with northwestern 
European countries. Although protectionist policies largely facilitated the British 
(English) wool textile trade on the seas, the increasing speed of production readily 
slowed after the 1690s. But other British products, especially those mainly intended 
for distant trade with the colonies, began to change the exporting structure once 
dominated by wool textile. David (1994) points out that, “the influence of 
transatlantic products many be noted in another development, not very important in 
the seventeenth century, but pointing the way which trade expansion would take in the 
first half of the next century This development was the growth of manufactured 
exports other than woolens.” 1 Although the volume of these miscellaneous 
manufactures was small, it was increasing quite fast. In the years surrounding the end 
of the third Anglo-Dutch war, the main market for these miscellaneous manufactures 
was in Europe. However, until to the beginning of eighteenth century, it was trade 
with the colonies that became principal. Taking London as an example, this change is 
quite impressive: 
 
      Exports of  Miscellaneous Manufactures (London only) (￡000)2 
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                                    1663/69         1699-1701 
West Africa, America and the East       86              259 
Europe, etc.                        136              161 
 
In such a condition, the robust expansion of foreign markets gave the cotton-like 
textiles the first opportunity to break the supremacy of wool textile in Britain.  
 
Before that, though, cotton textile was quite a marginal industry in the British Isles. 
Cotton textile production was not an indigenous industrial activity there. Compared to 
other countries on the European continent, the history of cotton textile in Britain is 
relatively short; the spread of cotton, an indigenous plant in India, was from the 
Mediterranean region to the northern part of continental Europe. The introduction of 
cotton into the Netherlands occurred before its introduction in Britain, and cotton 
textile production characterized proto-industrialization in the Netherlands. From the 
14
th
 century, migrants from Flanders brought the cotton textile technologies to 
England; this historians regard as the beginning of British cotton textile production. 
Proto-industrialization endued cotton textiles with a good opportunity to set root in 
Britain (England). At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the cotton textile 
industry took root in the region of Lancashire where the woolen textile production had 
already been, initially through the production of fustians, a combination of cotton weft 
and linen warp.
1
 The domestic cotton industry for the whole of the sixteenth century 
was quite marginal. Even at the eve of the Industrial Revolution, the British cotton 
textile industry could be comparable with the cotton textile industries in east and 
northwest European continental countries. According to Mantoux (1961),  
 
during this early period of the cotton industry in England the quality of the product 
was rather poor, and its quantity insignificant. Almost all the cotton stuffs sold in 
London and in the chef town came, more or less directly, from India. … One of the 
chief products sold to British public, and for which the demand grew ever greater, was 
cotton material, flowered fabrics, either painted or printed. Fashion took it up, and 
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soon these stuffs were all the rage. 
1
  
 
In this wool textile-dominated era, it would be very hard to predict that the Industrial 
Revolution would take place on the back of such an infant industry.  
 
 Technological backwardness is one of the major reasons that led to cotton textiles’ 
marginal position in proto-industrialization. Until the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, technology was still a major obstacle for the prevalence of domestic cotton 
textile products. According to the Mantoux (1961),  
 
the only things the Lancashire spinners, both male and female, lacked were the supple 
fingers and the extraordinary skill of the Indian workmen. The counts they spun. With 
implements as a matter of fact scarcely better than those used in India, were either too 
coarse or too weak. The custom therefore grew up of making materials which, at the 
beginning, laid the foundations of Manchester’s reputation. Printed by hand with 
engraved plates, they were able, if not to rival those of India, yet to serve as more or 
less acceptable substitutes, so that public taste could be satisfied, in spite of 
prohibitive legislation.
2
  
 
The technological backwardness of British (English) cotton textile industry remained 
for a long time and changed only when the fly shuttle was invented by John Kay in 
1733. Before that, just as Mantoux describes, the cotton industry survived in the 
narrow market in Britain (England). Facing the inflow of textiles from Asian colonies, 
the immature British (English) cotton industry was vulnerable. 
 
In its infancy, British (English) cotton textiles not only suffered from the incapability 
to compete with Asian textiles, but they were also in the shadow of 
proto-industrialized wool textile manufactures, which had already had strong political 
interests in the state and so received strong mercantilist support. During the 
mercantilist era, the wool textile industry that rose up from the countryside eventually 
obtained a strong influence in parliament through the big merchants of wool textile. 
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The wool interest’s panic about the dumping of Asian textiles, which were mainly 
cotton textiles or silk, into the British domestic market spread to similar products that 
were produced domestically. In such a condition, the protectionist strategies that were 
adopted initially to guard against Asian textiles were utilized to meet the hostilities of 
the new domestic textile industry. With the petitions of wool textile interests, the 
usage and consumption of painted and printed calico was forbidden within the 
territory. But compared to the ban on Asian textile, the pressure that the state exerted 
on domestic cotton textile manufacturing was weaker, since only two types of cotton 
textiles were on the list of prohibition.  
 
Therefore, the supremacy of wool textile interests constituted a big challenge to the 
infant cotton industry. However, since the protectionist measures were mainly against 
Asian textiles, the British (English) cotton industry also enjoyed the protection of the 
state’s mercantilist policies. Moreover, because the prohibition was only limited to 
paint and printed calico, the market for plain calicoes, which became the leading 
cotton textiles produced in Britain (England), grew fast. Compared to the wool textile 
industry, the development of the cotton industry seems more typical of 
import-substitution. According to O’ Brien (1991), for two decades after the turn of 
the century (seventeenth to eighteenth) the sales of plain calicoes, finished in London, 
substituted for calicoes printed and dyed in India.
1
 The effective barrier against 
India’s cotton industry kept the British cotton industry free from elimination in terms 
of free competition.  
 
The necessary protection against foreign industry was quite crucial for the survival of 
the early cotton textile industry, but it did not directly lead to its success years later. 
Domestic wool textile production received much more protection in the mercantilist 
period; however, the Industrial Revolution set its first steps in the cotton industry, 
rather than in the strong wool textile industry. How could this be? 
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Historians tie it to the machines that were used in the cotton industry. Although until 
the beginning of eighteenth century the technology that was used in cotton textile 
manufacturing was still incomparable to that in India, the innovation and utilization of 
machines in the following decades later quickly changed this contradiction of 
technological levels and began the legend of the British cotton industry. Actually, 
cotton is a fiber with more uniform strength and elasticity than flax or wool. Hence, 
theoretically, it could be easier to spin it mechanically. Compared to the wool textile 
industry then, the cotton textile industry was more suitable for experimenting with 
new machines. The first invention was the flying shuttle. Mantoux described the 
flying shuttle as follows,  
 
the invention of the fly shuttle was demanded by a practical difficulty which 
manufacturers daily experienced. It was impossible to obtain material of more than a 
certain width without employing two or more workmen. The width of the material 
which a single workman could make by throwing the shuttle from one hand to the 
other was obviously limited by the length by of his arms. Kay arranged for the shuttle 
to be automatically thrown from one side of the loom to the other. For this purpose, he 
fitted the shuttle with small wheels and set it in a kind of wooden groove, fixed so that 
it did not interfere with the alternating rise and warp. On either side, in order to give 
it a to-and-fro motion, he put two wooden hammers hung on horizontal rods. The two 
hammers were bound together by two strings attached to a single handle, so that with 
one hand the shuttle could be driven either way. The arrangement worked in the 
following manner: with a sharp tap the weaver caused first one and then the other 
hammer to move on its shuttle, which slid along its grove. At the end of each rod, 
there was a spring to stop the hammer and replace it in position.
1
  
 
The invention of the flying shuttle the cotton textile production did not need to depend 
on the workers’ weaving and spinning skills, but on the efficiency of the machine. 
Although the flying shuttle was driven by manpower, the popularity of it began the 
mechanization of the cotton textile industry. After the flying shuttle’s invention, other 
epoch-making machines were invented in the following decades. In the same year 
(1733) the flying shuttle was announced, John Wyatt made the first spinning machine. 
These both happened in the ending years of proto-industrialization. Moreover, another 
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two capital inventions in history, namely Hargreaves’s spinning jenny (1765) and 
Arkwright’s water frame (1767), were made when time was already in the years of the 
Industrial Revolution. However, neither of them were motor machines, hence they 
could be perceived as transitional inventions between proto-industrialization and 
typical urban factory industrialization in the common sense. These inventions did play 
a very important role in the history of textiles. What needs to be noted is that these 
machines in their original form were not sophisticated. But compared to the machines 
that were used in the wool textile industry in the seventeenth century, these inventions 
did not require the high personal spinning and weaving skills of workers. Hence, the 
efficiency of production was higher than those equipped the wool textile production. 
Take the spinning jenny as an example,  
 
it consisted of a rectangular frame on four legs. At one end was a row of vertical 
spindles. Across the frame were two parallel wooden rails, lying close together, which 
were mounted on a sort of carriage and slid backwards and forwards as desired. The 
cotton, which has been previously carded and roved, passed between the two rails and 
then was wound on the spindles. With one hand, the spinner worked the carriage 
backwards and forwards, and with the other he turned the handle which worked the 
spindles. In this way, the thread was drawn and twisted at the same time.
1
  
 
Technological progress was necessary for the development of the cotton industry, yet 
it could not fully ensure its later success, since the inventions that applied in the 
cotton textile industry were also equipped for other types of textile manufacturing. 
For example, the flying shuttle, spinning jenny and water frame were adopted by the 
wool textile industry several years after their successful application in the cotton 
industry. In this sense, technological progress could not constitute an absolute 
advantage for the cotton industry in the transition to the Industrial Revolution. 
 
Let us see the major differences that the wool and cotton textile industries had at the 
end of proto-industrialization. Generally, as opposed to the British infant wool textile 
industry in the countryside which, at its initial phase, was developed out of 
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monopolist state power, the cotton industry was established within the structure of the 
fiscal-military state. The state’s reform and transformation had already taken place 
prior to when the cotton industry was setting its foot in Lancashire. Through the 
struggles and concessions between the new mercantile class and the Crown, British 
(English) institutions of industry were eventually modernized and were more in favor 
of commercial and industrial interest. In this sense, the infant British (English) cotton 
industry was enjoying the fruit of the wool textile industry and other commercial 
interests’ efforts in the parliament. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the 
state’s regulation on the industry further declined. Wool textile production did obtain 
strong protections from the state and influenced the domestic cotton industry. 
However, the state’s support could not help the wool textile interests to maintain the 
guild-like monopoly any longer. In such a condition, the cotton industry enjoyed 
much more freedom than the wool textile industry in its infancy. Without strict 
industrial regulation, it was easier to experiment with technological and 
organizational innovations in this sector. Compared to the cotton industry the wool 
textile industry was well-protected, and so it turned conservative, especially in the 
aspects of organizational reform. The domestic system still dominated wool textile 
production and signs seldom indicated that the wool textile industry would attempt to 
further reduce transition costs via organizational reform. Even in the era of the 
Industrial Revolution, the domestic system was still dominant in this traditional 
industrial sector. Bythell (1983) owes the reason to the entrepreneur’s mind.  
 
A manufacturer who had grown up with the domestic system as the dominant mode of 
production in his trade would need strong inducements to abandon it, because under 
normal circumstances it offered him many advantages. If his employees provided their 
own tools and workrooms, he himself was spared the need to tie up his own capital in 
bricks and mortar and in machinery; and in times of periodic trade depression or 
slack seasonal demand- and most of these industries were subject to one or other of 
these risks, if not, indeed, to both of them-it was the worker, not his employer, who 
suffered when plant and equipment were standing idle.
1
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But as a young industry, the cotton industry did not have such strong limitations. In 
fact, in an era dominated by wool textiles, the first manufacturers of cotton textiles 
were the people who were adventurous and dared to risk. The cotton textile industry 
caught the chance and pioneered in organizational innovation. The most significant 
result was the emergence of the factory system in the cotton industry.  
 
The typical scene of early factories was that labors from households were organized 
under the same roof. The emergence of the factory did not only bring a change in 
working location, it also altered working ethics and the degree of the specialization of 
labor. Furthermore, manufacturing bodies in the domestic system were 
mutual-independent households. This scattered production mode always yielded high 
transaction costs, generated from the change and trade between different 
manufacturing bodies. The factory system, however, was organized production in a 
particular place, equipped with machines, and under the supervision of an 
entrepreneur largely mitigated the barriers between different manufacturing and 
trading processes. Hence, compared to domestic system, this new mode of production 
yielded much lower transaction costs. From the domestic system to the factory system, 
the road was not paved overnight. The entire phase-out of the domestic system was as 
late as the nineteenth century. In this long process, the inventor of the water frame, 
Arkwright was a noteworthy figure. Before him, some attempts to establish silk 
factory was made, however these attempts finally failed in the 1730s. Arkwright was 
luckier than his precursors. The first factory he set up was located at Cromford in 
1771, the year he joined forces with Need and Strutt. This factory benefited from his 
invention of the water frame. The new machine produces a much stronger thread than 
the most skilled spinner could have made with a spinning wheel. Instead, therefore, of 
weaving materials which were partly linen and only partly cotton, it became possible 
to weave pure cotton goods, which were as perfect in every respect as their Indian 
models.
1
 Arkwright got his patent for the water frame in 1769. This kind of machine 
ensured his technological advantage in facing the competition of the wool textile 
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industries that were organized in the domestic system. To assist in its effective 
functioning, he established the factory near a powerful source of water. Cromford lies 
on the Derwent, at a point where the river runs swift and powerful through a narrow 
gorge quite close to the picturesque hills of its origin. A little way above, the hot 
waters of Matlock flow into it and prevent it from ever freezing in winter. It was 
therefore a suitable place for building a mill”1 The factory he established grew very 
quickly. Eight years after its establishment, it already contained several thousand 
spindles and employed three hundred workmen.
2
 From proto-industrialization to the 
Industrial Revolution, Arkwright’s factory was perceived as a symbol of transition. 
Mantoux divided the early cotton industry development into two stages. The first is 
the period immediately following Hargreaves’s invention. There were still very few 
factories, for capitalistic organization had not yet taken on its soon-to-be conspicuous 
shape. At least in appearance, that was the golden age of domestic industry.
3
 The 
second period began with that memorable trial which ended in the cancelling of 
Arkwright’s patent (This occurred in 1785). From that moment, factories became 
standard throughout the textile industry. 
4
  
 
In this great transition the factory system, a new type of production organization, 
suffered the hostility from those manufacturers who survived on the domestic system. 
The Act of 1735, which allowed the manufacture of mixed materials, had confirmed 
the prohibition of printed cotton goods
5
, and was taken as the weapon to fight against 
Arkwright’s challenges. But at this time, although wool textile stakeholders in 
parliament had strong power, they could not obtain the absolute power necessary to 
constitute the monopoly as urban merchants had in the seventeenth century. Hence 
after Arkwright’s defense, the parliament agreed to Arkwright’s justifiable requests. 
From that time onwards, the cotton industry was able to develop without impediment 
in the structure of the factory system. What needs to be noted is that the domestic 
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system did not phase-out soon after the establishment of the factory. Until the middle 
of the nineteenth century, the domestic system could still be seen in cottages. But, the 
declining speed of the domestic system in the cotton industry was much faster than in 
the wool industry, albeit the wool industry followed in the steps of cotton industry to 
adopt this new production mode after its successful application in the cotton sector. 
Thereafter, the balance of power between the wool textile industry and cotton textiles 
changed. With more organized and mechanized modes of production, the cotton 
industry sharply changed the structure of British exports. The colonizing power of the 
British all over the world enormously expanded its foreign market, which offered the 
domestic industries, especially textile manufacturing, with further Smithian dynamics 
of development. The supremacy of the cotton industry appeared in such a condition. It 
happened at the upsurge of the Industrial Revolution, when Britain was coming into 
the Age of Steam. But all this began with the establishment of the factory system at 
the end of proto-industrialization.  
 
If we inquiry into the state’s role in this great transition, we see that the birth of the 
factory system was not related to the state’s intervention. Just as with the domestic 
system, the birth of the factory system resulted from some merchants’ brave attempts 
and innovations. But the differences between these two cases are also obvious. The 
emergence of the domestic system in the wool textile industry suffered strong 
antagonism from the guild system, which was supported by the state. For a long-time, 
the domestic system remained at the cottage level and the big merchants were 
involved into this system until as late as the mercantilist era. Compared to the 
domestic system, the factory system was spreading much more smoothly, albeit it also 
suffered from the antagonism of those merchants who depended on the domestic 
system. After its successful application in the cotton industry, the factory system was 
adopted by other sectors: not only other textile industries, but also other non-textile 
sectors. Compared to seventeenth-century Britain (England), in which the shift from 
the guild system to the domestic system could not have happened had the state did not 
passed the Statute of Monopolies, eighteenth-century Britain was much more suitable 
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for  organizational innovation. Although economic historians distinguish these two 
centuries as the century of industrialization and the era of the Industrial Revolution, 
they were very much so connected. The latter was exposed to the strong influence of 
the former. The better domestic environment in the eighteenth century for 
organizational innovation could be perceived as the fruit of former domestic reforms, 
especially the retreat of the state’s power from the management of enterprises via 
guilds. It is hard to imagine how the Industrial Revolution would have been if the 
state-granted guild system still controlled the industries, because the industrial 
regulation that guilds had strictly limited the number of workers or apprentices, the 
tools being utilized as well as productivities in every workshop. What the guilds 
controlled was not only the market, but also the management of every single 
production unit. Taking the guilds’-perspective, Arkwright-like entrepreneurs should 
be excluded from industrial activities, since their technological and organizational 
innovations were strong threats to the internal order of guilds. The end of the guilds’ 
monopoly not only liberalized the market, but also kept the state away from the 
management of enterprises. Plus, mercantilist policies had the effect of protecting the 
domestic market from the tremendous inflow of foreign goods, and so the venerable 
domestic textile industries were able to upgrade in a relatively suitable environment of 
import substitution. The cotton industry at the end of the proto-industrialization era 
was lucky enough to catch this opportunity and pioneered the establishment of the 
new mode of production. What needs to be noted is that, just as mentioned above, the 
retreat of the state’s monopoly in industrial activities was the result of the efforts 
made by the emerging merchants in parliament - especially those big wool textile 
merchants - who represented the interests of the most significant industry in the 
proto-industrialization era. In this sense, the cotton textile industry’s story of success 
was built on its predecessor and rival’s triumph in the seventeenth century. 
 
4. Textile Industry and State: Southern Song Dynasty 
Among all unified Chinese dynasties, Song Dynasty could be seen as the weakest one 
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in the dimension of military performance. Compared to the former unified dynasty – 
the Tang (A.D.618- 907), the Chinese Empire in Song Dynasty was turning from 
outward and expansionary to inward and conservative. Accompanying the shrinking 
of the territory, the culture in Song Dynasty also experienced a great shift. Generally 
speaking, Song’s culture eventually became very vulnerable due to failures in military 
actions against the northern states. The economy in Song Dynasty, however, was 
developed in another direction. Since the loss of the territory in the North West, the 
economic centre of the Chinese Empire was eventually shifting to the southeast. This 
shift is quite significant for China, even until modern times. Before Song Dynasty, the 
economic and political centre was in the yellow river basin. Thus, all unified 
dynasties before Song Dynasty regarded the northwest part of today’s China as its 
lifeline and the expansion of Chinese Empire were mainly westwards. In commercial 
aspects, the foreign trade before the Song Dynasty was mainly through the Mongolia 
Plateau and central Asia. Song Dynasty was confined to the region south of the 
Yellow river and completely lost the Hexi Corridor (in Gansu Province) which 
connected Yellow River Basin with central Asia. The loss in the west urged Song 
Dynasty to gain in the southeast. In Northern Song Dynasty (A.D. 960- 1127), the 
Yangtze Delta and Sichuan Basin, which was famous for its fertility had already 
attacked Chinese people from North. In the year of 1126, Kaifeng city, the capital city 
of Song Dynasty was captured by Jurchen troops. About a year after, the court was 
restored in the city of Lin’an (today’s Hangzhou) by Emperor Gaozong. Although he 
tried to recover the lost territory in the first few years of his reign, the strategy he 
adopted in the end was to pay the tribute to the Jin Dynasty. The Chinese Empire thus 
retreated to the south part of Northern Song Dynasty and took the Huai River as its 
northern border. The territorial change pushed the economic centre tremendously 
south. Yangtze Delta and Sichuan Basin’s position in the South Song economy was 
incredibly improved. Moreover, since the traditional trade line was cut by the 
Northern states, new commercial routes needed to be found. In South Song Dynasty, 
the rebuilding of foreign trade went in two directions. One is southwestwards, often 
with Tibetan and other ethnic groups, mainly for obtaining horses; the other was to the 
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sea. Because of the booming of ocean trade, a large number of immigrants rushed to 
the Lingnan(岭南) Region, which includes today’s Guangxi, Guangdong and Fujian 
Provinces. Thus, this undeveloped region before Song Dynasty became fully 
populated and some commercial ports became the crucial origin of the Empire’s tax 
income. The alleged Marine Silk Road which existed even before Song Dynasty 
became significant. The southeastward development changed the traditional way of 
Chinese economic development. China changed from a typically inland country to a 
country facing sea and continent simultaneously. This tendency continued after the 
Song Dynasty. Ming and Qing adopted close door policies which negatively 
influenced the overseas trade. However, the Marine Silk Road was not stopped. 
Although Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties were all unified dynasties and the west and 
north region was recovered, the economic centre of the Chinese Empire was not 
changed throughout about 600 years: The Yangtze Delta was always the most 
developed region with the high technological level; and Sichuan Basin and 
neighboring regions constitute the cornerstone of the Empire’s economy. Even when 
China came into the modern era, these two regions played similar roles as they did in 
South Song Dynasty: Yangtze Delta was the first region to erect modern industries, 
and Sichuan Province was the region that supported the nationalist regime to persist to 
the end of World War II. In a macro-historical perspective, China’s current economic 
geography was shaped in Song, or more precisely, Southern Song Dynasty.  
 
4.1 Brief Introduction of Textile Production in South Song Dynasty 
Opposite to the case of the British, the textile industry in China relied heavily on the 
silk production. Besides silk, hemp and ramie were also traditional fabrics that were 
utilized as textile material. The silk-dominated structure lasted until the collapse of 
South Song Dynasty. Actually, this structure was adopted from the former dynasties. 
In the Ming and Qing Dynasties, cotton served as a crucial fabric in textile production 
to change the Chinese textile structure. Reviewing the history of cotton in China, we 
could find that the first step of the cotton textile production set in Yangtze Delta took 
place in South Song Dynasty.  
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South Song’s textile industry was established on the basis of the Northern Song 
Dynasty. In Northern Song Dynasty, the silk production was concentrated in the 
Yellow River Basin, Sichuan Province and mid and lower Yangtze River valley plain. 
Because of the influence of the war, in the middle 11
th
 century, the centers of Northern 
Song textile industries began to move to southern China. After Emperor Gaozong’s 
retreat to Hangzhou, Yangtze Delta and Sichuan Plain became the main region 
producing silk for the Empire. These two regions were slight differently specialized: 
according to Ge(2008), the Sichuan region was famous for high-grade silks, 
especially silk brocade. The history of silk brocade can be traced back to the Eastern 
Han Dynasty (25 A.D.-220 A.D.) Through around 1000 years of development, the silk 
brocade production in Sichuan reached its peak. Throughout the Southern Song 
Dynasty, it was the region that produced high-grade silk for the Crown and officials of 
the Empire. According to Ge (2008), in Southern Song Dynasty, the annual 
high-grade silk tribute from Sichuan to the court was approximately 110,000 pieces.
1
 
In the case of the mid- and lower- Yangtze River Basin, it was famous for its large 
productivity. Since the capital of the Empire moved to Hangzhou, large migrations of 
troops and civilians into the Yangtze River Basin stimulated the consumption of 
textiles. In Shaoxing (绍兴) years (1131A.D.-1162 A.D. in Emperor Gaozong’s reign), 
the rate of silk textile products as tax payments was as high as 3.96 million pieces 
annually.
2
 Besides the silk for normal consumption, this region was also providing 
the Royal family and officials of Emperor with high-grade silk. Although these 
regions produced large quantity of silks, the normal textile for use in households and 
troops were hemp and ramie. The region that produced the most hemp or ramie 
productions was located in today’s Guangxi, Canton and Sichuan Provinces. In other 
regions, additional productions also existed. In the Yangtze Delta region, new types of 
hemp and ramie textiles were invented. At that time, nearly every important city had 
its own textile style. 
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In Southern Song dynasty, because of the inflows of migrants from the North, silk, 
hemp and ramie produced in southern China were not able to supply enough fabric to 
the increasing population. In such a condition, cotton was introduced into Sichuan and 
areas south of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. Before that, cotton was 
introduced from Hainan Island and growing regions were pushed to today’s Canton 
and Fujian Provinces at the end of Northern Song Dynasty. As a supplement to 
traditional textile, cotton textile did not have the quantitative advantages in Southern 
Song Dynasty. Its position as a dominant textile in China was as late as Qing Dynasty. 
But even compare to the cotton industry in Britain at the eve of Industrial Revolution, 
the productivity in South Song Dynasty was larger. According to Ge(2008), only in 
the areas south to the lower reaches of Yangtze river alone, the weavers and spinners 
produce around 200,000 pieces cotton cloth annually. 
 
In the British case, the textile industry in the countryside experienced a process that 
went from zero to prosperity; the case of Southern Song Dynasty followed another 
way. Since Southern Song Dynasty adopted everything from Northern Song Dynasty, 
no matter in whether technological, organizational or institutional aspects, from the 
beginning of Southern Song Dynasty, the textile industry had already reached a high 
level. Economic historians always marvel at the technological accomplishment that 
Southern Song Dynasty achieved. In the textile sector, the degree of mechanization 
even reached its peak in pre-modern Chinese history. In Dieter Kuhn’s work The Age 
of Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China, he described some 
representative machinery that was utilized in silk production. Silk-reeling is a very 
important technique for silk-production. In two Song Dynasty, this process was 
mechanized with a reeling frame, which was an extraordinary sophisticated machine. 
Kuhn (2009) did some researches on this kind of machine from the depiction from 
Book on Sericulture written by scholar-official Qin Guan around 1090. Many silk 
reels were operated by two workers and were furnished with a treadle. If two frames 
were used for reeling, a daily output of up to 2,869 grams of raw silk thread was 
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possible – a figure that compares favorably with the daily output of factory workers 
using steam-powered silk reels in the nineteenth century.
1
  
 
Normal textile consumption for civilians in Southern Song Dynasty was hemp and 
ramie cloth. The mechanization degree in the production of these textiles was also 
remarkable. Kuhn (2009) valued the spinning frames, which were described in the 
Book of Agriculture, namely Nongshu of 1313. It described “two types of the big 
spinning frames, one type driven by hand or animal, the other by water power, both 
ideally suited for twisting fibers of ramie and hemp.”2 The size of this machine was 
large. “The length of the machine measured more than 620 centimeters, its width 
about 155 centimeters. All functional parts were worked by three driving belts, their 
speeds dependent on the velocity of rotation of the big driving wheel. The general 
structure and functional parts of the frame were borrowed from silk machinery. The 
material to be twisted and wound was placed in circular layers in thirty-two 
cylindrical wooden boxes, which could produce almost 60 kilograms of low-twisted 
yarn in twenty hours. With ramie, the water-driven frame could be worked all year 
round except during the few weeks in winter when the river froze.”3  
 
In the British (English) case, the first factory opened by Arkwright was established on 
the basis of utilization of the water mill. The above mentioned Song spinning frames 
driven by water power were also set in the water mill. In this sense, in Southern Song 
Dynasty, the mechanization level was compatible with Britain at the end of 
proto-industrialization and the beginning of Industrial Revolution. Kuhn (2009) gives 
high praise to machines for spinning. He believes that these spinning frames “were 
early predecessors of the box-spinning machine, which was adapted for Italian silk 
manufacture and British cotton technology, namely those formed the mechanical basis 
for the industrial revolution in Europe.”4 These technological advantages facilitated 
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the textile production and improved Southern Song Dynasty’s large manufacturing 
ability in a relatively limited territory. The bulk of these technologies and machines 
were invented in Northern Song Dynasty and spread with migrations to Southern 
China in Southern Song. In this sense, quite different to the British (English) case, the 
industrialization of textile production in Southern Song Dynasty began with a high 
technological level. In the Southern Song era, these machines and technologies were 
used in two textile sectors. The first pattern was in state-owned or government-run 
textile workshops or water mills. These production places were for serving the Crown, 
empire officials and royal troops. Usually these workshops or mills were large and 
used relatively higher-level technologies, compared with the textile production in 
private sectors. This production was adopted from the beginning of the Northern Song 
Dynasty. As early as 970, Emperor Taizu established two water mill agencies, one in 
the west of Kaifeng and one in the east, each of them operating a mill that provided 
the Imperial Palace and residents of the capital with flour. Each of the mills was 
headed by two officials and staffed of 205 workers.
1
 In Southern Song Dynasty, since 
the loss of northern territory, the government-run workshops and mills moved to 
Sichuan and Zhejiang. In the year of 1161, in Hangzhou Lingjinyuan (绫锦院), a 
workshop for the imperial palace, 1000 workers worked with spinning and weaving 
frames. 
2
 The textile production in this kind of pattern did not consider the 
productivities and cost. For the normal consumption of textile in Southern Song, the 
main body of production was the private sector. This production pattern took place in 
households in rural areas. The machine used by rural households could not be as 
sophisticated as the ones that government-run workshops used, but the technology 
level was also relatively high, compared to the rural wool textile industry in Britain. 
The above-mentioned spinning frame was used by the women in rural areas in 
Southern Song Dynasty as a tool. The household textile production was usually taken 
as a supplement to the farming. However, in the area such as Yangtze Delta, the 
specialized households that were dependent on the textile productions, namely the 
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alleged jihu (机户 the household owning machines) were also prevailing in Southern 
Song. Usually, these types of households owned more machines than normal rural 
households. 
 
In such a condition, the textile boom was taking place soon after the settle-down of 
the court in Hangzhou. Compared to the British case, in which the technological 
evolution took around two centuries from proto-industrialization to Industrial 
Revolution, the speed with which technology evolved in Southern Song was very fast. 
This could be an instance of the Chinese state’s stationary efficiency, mentioned by 
Wong (1997). The history, however, seems to end in Southern Song. In Yuan, Ming 
and Qing Dynasties, although the productivity was increasing due to the expansion of 
the population, the inventions of technologies and machines never reappeared with 
such vitality. Some of the machines could not even be re-produced in later Chinese 
history. Advanced as these machines and technologies were, these high-level 
inventions in Southern Song Dynasty did not lead to a revolution of textile 
manufacture in China, albeit they were prevalent in the textile sector all over the 
Sothern China. Why were the technological advantages in Southern Song not 
preserved by the Chinese Empire? To answer this question, a detailed observation of 
Southern Song textile production in non-technological aspects is necessary. 
 
4.2 Proto-industrialization, textile manufacture and its dynamics 
In Southern Song Dynasty, two different production patterns co-existed in the Empire.  
Since the main body of Southern Song textile production was in rural households, we 
could say proto-industrialization also took place in South Song’s textile production. 
The productivity of textile in the rural areas was considerable. In most of areas, the 
division of labor in a rural household was “farming by men and weaving by women”. 
The basic aim of textile production in the rural household is two-fold: one is for 
self-use; another is for the tax payment. 
 
Household self-use or self-support was the traditional textile manufacturing in 
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pre-modern China. In traditional Chinese rural production patterns, namely ‘farming 
by male and weaving by female’, textile production supplied necessary fabrics to 
meet the living demand. The textiles produced in this way did not come into market 
circulation. In Southern Song Dynasty, major portions of self-use textile were hemp 
and ramie cloth, since silk was traditionally reserved to officials. But according to 
Ge(2008), since the improvement of silk textile technologies, large numbers of silk 
surplus rendered this high-grade textile available for the common people.
1
 Due to the 
big population in Southern Song, the quantity of self-use textiles would have been 
large. Wu (2008) did a thorough statistical analysis of the Sothern Song (since the war, 
the data from 1127 to1159 was not available) population. In the year of 1159, the total 
number of households was 11,091,885
2
 and in the year the Southern Song was 
defeated by the Mongolian troops, the total number was 11,746,000
3
. The peak of 
total household numbers was 12,907,438
4
, in 1189, during Emperor Xiaozong’s reign. 
The total number of households in Southern Song was relatively stable, although it 
was negatively influenced by the war. Although there is no data about how much 
textile was produced for self-use exactly, the stability of household numbers ensures 
the large volume of textiles for household self-use.  
 
Besides the ‘farming by men and weaving by women’ production pattern, in Southern 
Song Dynasty, some rural households eventually separated from the farming and 
became specialized in industrial activities that related to textile manufacturing. In 
Anji(安吉) county (in Zhejiang), the bulk of households were making their living on 
silk worm rearing and silk production. Raising ten bolt of silk worm could support a 
rural household with ten members to obtain food and necessary cloth for a year.
5
 
Zhejiang was suffering from the scarcity of land after the huge inflow of migration 
from North. According Ge (2008)’s calculation, the productivity of silk worm rearing 
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and silk production was five times that of farming
1
. Hence, the rural household tended 
to specialize in the former. The specialization of silk production triggered the 
emergence of market-oriented textile production, especially silk production. Since silk 
production involves silk worm rearing and silk weaving, two processes which were 
relatively independent, the deepening of specialization gave rise to the households of 
silkworm and mulberry (cansang hu 蚕桑户 or sangyuan hu 桑园户 ) and 
households owning weaving machines (jihu 机户). In some regions in Zhejiang, 
because of the increase in households that only made a living on silk production, the 
demand of mulberry leaves also rose up. The trade of mulberry became a profitable 
business for the rural areas that were suitable to plant mulberry trees on a large scale 
since the demand of these raw materials was really large. In Southern Song, the areas 
near Hangzhou had already formed markets for mulberry leaf trade. Sometimes, those 
households specializing in silkworm or mulberry also engaged in the production of 
raw silk. The market of raw silk was also established in the Southern Song Dynasty. 
Both of these two markets facilitated the households of machines, since they could 
obtain the raw materials from trade, rather than being dependent on self-production. 
The households specializing in weaving machines were also a common phenomenon 
in Southern Song. Yangtze Delta was the region that these households assembled. The 
majority of these households were in rural areas, whereas in urban areas textile 
manufacturing households existed but were less common. For example, the bulk of 
the residents in Jinhua(金华) County took silk weaving as their source of living. In 
most cases, the households of weaving machines could be seen as handcraft 
workshops that involved the family members. In these households, the traditional 
production pattern was changed. The difference between gender roles in such 
households was not as strict as in common ones and men became the important 
laborer in the silk production. A normal household may have owned one or several 
machines. For those large ones, the number of machines they preserved was usually in 
the tens or even more than a hundred. Big households of machines could not only 
maintain themselves on the labor of family members, and unusually they employed 
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those people who lost land in rural areas or poor people from the cities. This situation 
was quite similar to the British case in the wood-pasture region. The difference is that 
the regions that had households focusing on weaving machines in Southern Song 
Dynasty were much bigger than those in British case. The total number of households 
of machines was also large. According to Qi, throughout the Song Dynasty, the total 
number of such households was around 100,000, approximately 0.5%-0.7% of total 
households
1
.  
 
Households of machine were specialized in the production, but their products need to 
be traded for food, non-textile goods or money. This demand created the opportunity 
for middle men who connected the manufacturer and market. In general, they 
provided loans to the household owning machines at the beginning of the year. In the 
time between summer and autumn, they charged a certain quantity of textile as 
repaying. Almost the bulk of production from households owning machine was 
collected in the hand of middlemen and after this, the middlemen’s role would change 
into tradesmen in the textile market. They are quite similar to the clothier in British 
(English) case, but the difference is that the clothier also granted the domestic 
production with raw materials whereas the middlemen in Southern Song seem only to 
have granted the households of machines with the capital for production. As for the 
raw materials, such as hemp, ramie and raw silks, they could be obtained in the 
special market mentioned earlier. In such a condition, household owning machines, 
markets of raw materials and middlemen formed a Chinese “domestic system” that 
was similar to the British case. Even disregarding the division of labor or 
mechanization degree, the domestic system in Southern Song was comparable to that 
in the later phase of British proto-industrialization.  
 
In Southern Song Dynasty, as in most of the Chinese dynasties, another crucial aim of 
silk production was for tax-paying. The Southern Song Dynasty adopted the two-tax 
system, which was established by Yang Yan in 780. Initially, the tax was collected 
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according to local conditions in either one or two payments per year, in summer or in 
autumn.
1
 The two-tax system replaced an old system consisting of a land tax paid 
annually in the form of cereal grains, duty paid in form of textile fabrics and 
compulsory service provided in the form of time and labor.
2
 From Tang Dynasty to 
Song Dynasty, since the improvement of farming productivity, the tax that was paid in 
the form of textiles was also growing considerably. According to Kuhn (2009) the tax 
fabric requirement was higher than former dynasties in two Song Dynasty. Standard 
pieces of silk tax fabric measured between 13.29 meters long and 79 centimeters wide. 
Throughout two Song Dynasty, the annual figure of silk tabby weaves accounted to 
around 2.9 million bolts. But what needs to be noted is that, in Southern Song Dynasty, 
the monetization of tax-paying had already started. As very important commercial 
goods that rural households produced, textile fabrics infolded into the market and 
changed into currency. Although the exact quantity of this sort of textile production is 
unavailable, considering the sharp increase of tax during Southern Song, it must have 
been very large. 
 
In addition to paying annual taxes, there was a “harmonious beforehand selling” 
(heyumai 和预买) policy, whereby the government gave tax credits to farmers, which 
were paid back in silk fabrics. This system was started to ensure the government 
could get enough fabrics with a reasonable price. The profit of farmers was also taken 
into consideration initially. To the Southern Song era, however, this equal trade policy 
transformed into a tax-like obligation. Then this system amounted to a compulsory 
sale to the state of enormous quantities of silk at a vastly reduced price.
3
 According 
to Wang (2006), the farmers sold the textiles to the government with a price as low as 
one third of price in the market,
4
 but the quantities of textiles that government 
purchased with this principal was much larger than the tax fabric. In Northern Song 
era, 30 million bolts of silk were purchased in the name of harmonious beforehand 
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selling and in Southern Song, since there had been an increase in production, it was 
expanded. In Southern Song, since the improvement of the monetization of tax, the 
government formulated the “silk-convert money” (zheboqian 折帛钱) policies on the 
basis of harmonious beforehand selling, namely converting the textiles that needed to 
be paid in summer tax and in harmonious beforehand into a fixed amount of money 
and obligating the farmers to pay in cash annually, no matter whether the price of the 
textile increases or declines in the market. Actually, the silk-convert money was 
usually higher than the market price. In order to obtain more cash to pay this new tax, 
the farmers had to sell more home-produced textile in the market. Compared to only 
paying the two-tax and harmonious beforehand selling in real textile, silk-convert 
money actually absorbed more textile fabrics and increased the burden of rural 
households. With such a pressure, the weavers needed to throw their shuttles to and 
fro and fill the cloth beam inch by inch everyday to meet the demand of the state. The 
working hours were usually long. Although the Industrial Revolution did not happen 
in Song, the “industrious revolution” readily took place in such a condition. 
 
4.3 State’s Role and Dynamics of Textile Manufacture 
As mentioned above, three non-technological factors constitute the dynamics of 
textile manufacture development in Song Dynamics. If we look into these dynamics 
deeper, we will see that with the exception of textile-production for self-use the other 
two dynamics, namely manufacture for market and for tax-paying were directly 
exposed to the influence of the state. 
 
The expansion of the market was not a spontaneous process in Song Dynasty. Before 
Song, the market was under the control of the state in both the urban and rural areas. 
Compared to European cities, in Chinese history cities functioned more as a hub of 
political power, rather than a commercial node. The commercial activities in cities 
were strictly planned by the government; in particular space and time. These spacial 
and time restrictions began to be removed from Northern Song Dynasty. In both of the 
two Song Dynasties, the government broke the distinctions between the residential 
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area (fang,坊) and commercial area(shi 市). The urban residents could set up shops or 
commercial places relatively freely in terms of getting the state’s permission. 
Moreover, in the urban area the ban on commercial activities at night was abolished 
and in some cities, the commercial activities could be seen for all day and all night. 
The commercial activities in the rural areas, which used to be repressed by the local 
government, also boomed. Two Song’s policies on rural market were laissez-fair, 
namely the state totally retreated from the control of the market in the rural area and 
rural residents could establish regular market according to their own will. The 
above-mentioned trade of raw silk and mulberry leaves took place in the free rural 
market without the state’s control or supervision. Government’s tolerance towards the 
domestic market even influenced its policies of foreign trade. Of all the Chinese 
dynasties, the Song was regarded as a “mercantilist dynasty” for its peculiarly positive 
attitude towards foreign trade. Not again until modern times have there been so many 
open ports in China. In the Northern Song era, nine ports were opened for foreign 
trade, which were even four more than ports than were opened after the first Opium 
War between Qing and Britain. Because the loss of northern territory, the open ports 
in Southern Song was fewer than Northern Song, but the number was still as large as 
eight. Quanzhou (泉州) was the biggest among them. Southern Song government 
established the Maritime Trade Commissions (shibosi,市舶司) to manage these big 
ports. The task of these commissions were (1) to supervise the Chinese merchant 
going aboard and to license their ships, (2) to handle the affairs of the foreign 
merchants in China, (3) to inspect merchant ships and (4) to levy duties on imports.
1
 
Song government levied duties at the rate of around ten percent. With this the state 
became the biggest beneficiary of this system. But since Southern Song government 
did not directly monopolize the trade, in turn, its policies towards overseas trade were 
quite tolerant. Except the goods for the military use or under state’s control, almost 
every kind of good could be traded in these ports. Moreover, the Southern Song Navy 
protected the mercantile ships from piracy and other threats. The Southern Song 
government’s mercantilist actions were different from its precedent and successor. In 
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Tang Dynasty, only one port enjoyed such kind of support from the state, and in the 
Ming and Qing Dynasties, the state even suppressed foreign trade and implemented 
strong restrictions on the limited ports that were open. Hence, among all of the 
Chinese dynasties, the transaction cost of the overseas trade that was generated by 
state was the lowest. In such a condition, the foreign market developed as another 
major market for the domestic products, although it was still much smaller than the 
domestic market. The textiles, especially those high-grade silks, went through the 
open ports and were transported to Southeast Asia and Arabian Peninsular. The 
number of opened ports was less than ten, whereas the volume of textile trade in these 
ports consisted of 5 percent of total volume. Although the foreign trade was not as 
crucial as that in the British case, it readily stimulated the textile production in 
Southern Song territory, especially in costal regions, such as Yangtze Delta, Fujian 
and Canton. 
 
In short, the state of Southern Song held a mercantilist attitude toward the market. The 
basic reason for British mercantilism’s prevalence in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century was policy makers’ understanding about the positive effect of trade on a 
state’s wealth. Interestingly, as a traditional Confucian dynasty, Song Dynasty 
generated similar ideas spontaneously. In Song Dynasty, the Neo-Confucian dogma of 
the Cheng Brothers and Zhuxi which was respected as orthodox by Ming and Qing 
rulers were inchoate in the two Song Dynasties. In the meanwhile, the “Gongli” (功利, 
success and profit) school of Confucianism became the more popular and more 
representative of the temper and the spirit of the time. This philosophy sought the 
aims of enriching the country and building up its armed strength
1
. With this objective, 
the government turned to support the business activities and any innovation or 
improvement of production. As early as Northern Song, the empire’s reformers such 
as Fan Zhongyan and Wang Anshi adopted these ideas. Such concepts urged the 
government to rethink the traditional ways of administration and the relative liberal 
policies were adopted. Hence, it could be seen that in trade in the rural area, the state 
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nearly retreated from the monopoly.  
 
Here another question arises: why did the empire’s officials began to embrace the 
Gongli school of Confucianism in Song Dynasty but not in Tang dynasties which also 
seems open and tolerant? The reason should be Song’s fiscal situation. Both Northern 
and Southern Song were facing a serious fiscal problem generated by the continuous 
wars against northern states and also big systems of bureaucracy. Both of two Song 
Dynasty were self-contradictory dynasties. On one hand, they were facing the 
strongest military opponents from the north and needing a big reserve of army; on the 
other hand all emperors followed the Emperor Taizu’s notion that military power 
should be marginalized to prevent a revolution similar to what happened in 960. From 
the beginning of the Northern Song, the emperor sharply promoted the status of civil 
officials and the bureaucracy system swelled tremendously. Either increasing wars 
against the northern states or the expansion of the empire’s bureaucratic system, both 
of these two tendencies consumed a great number of fiscal resources of the empire. As 
early as the beginning of the Northern Song, this fiscal problem became distinct. As 
Lo (1969) mentioned, 
 
the government was saddled with an outsized administrative staff and its army in the 
middle of the eleventh century had four times the number of troops it had seventy 
years before. War expenses during the last years of Northern Song consumed fifty of 
the sixty million strings of cash received as revenue
1
.  
 
The situation got more serious after the collapse of Northern Song. The fall of North 
China to the Jurchen invaders disrupted the economic life of the Song Dynasty. With 
the curtailment of agricultural and industrial production, the cash receipts, which 
constituted about half of the income of the state, shrank to a little more than ten 
million strings. Meanwhile, expenses mounted. In the first years of the Southern Song, 
the outlay for the army came to 800,000 strings a month or about 9,600,000 strings a 
year, and the expenditures climbed further when Song Government intensified its 
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rearmament program and when it paid tribute to the Chin court
1
. In order to resolve 
this problem, a new source of income needs to be found. The expansion of the market 
could provide the state with a huge and stable administrative income. Therefore, 
commercial activities turned to be regarded as in favor of the state and thus were 
supported.  
 
The expansion of the market via Song state’s mercantilism did open another source of 
state’s income. However, Song did not develop into another kind of state. Although 
the commercial activities were flourishing, Song was still an agricultural society 
which laid its fiscal foundation on the collection of tax from rural areas. The income 
that the state absorbed from farming and rural textile manufacture was much larger 
than that from the commercial activities. Hence, compared to the dynamics generated 
from market expansion, the direct tax via means of textiles was much a stronger 
dynamic that stimulated the increase of textile industrial activities in rural areas.  
 
4.4 Tax, State and Stagnation of the Organizational Change  
This situation was quite different from Europe. In the British case, the commercial 
activities ensured the sustainability of the state’s income. In pre-industrial era Britain, 
the bulk of the taxes that the state levied were indirect tax. The way to the Industrial 
Revolution was parallel to the process of commercialization of the state. In Southern 
Song era, the urbanization process that accompanied the commercialization of the 
state was also obvious.  The development of a commercial society in Southern Song 
was embodied in the financial tools that developed to meet the demands of 
commercial activities.  These tools were similar to or even in advance of those in the 
eighteenth century Britain. However, the relationship between the court and rural 
society remained as simple and direct as previous dynasties. For example, just as 
mentioned above, the major income of the Empire was still the two-tax system, which 
was a heritage from Tang Dynasty. “Harmonious beforehand selling” and 
“silk-convert money” were only the extensions of this kind of system. Southern Song 
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did experience a kind of economic transition. The economic transition, however, was 
mainly in the liberalization of the market dimension, especially foreign trade. This 
said the expansion of the market and the booming of urban commercial life did not let 
the state change into to the Britain-like mercantilist country which laid its economic 
fundament on the commercial activities, albeit both of them developed their own 
mercantilism. The mercantilism in Southern Song was advocated and implemented by 
the Empire officials, who were not involved in the commercial and industrial 
activities themselves; whereas in the British case, the big merchants who were related 
to manufacturing and trade had their own position in parliament and with the 
deepening of proto-industrialization; their influence on politics eventually became 
stronger. In such a condition, the results of the mercantilism in these two countries 
became diversified: In Southern Song, the market reform was only taken as a new 
way to expand the empire’s financial basis and it did not provoke any fundamental 
change in the state; whereas Britain totally changed into a country that lived on trade 
and manufacture for trade. Thus, Southern Song formed a structure of dual economy: 
in the cities, the trade and related financial activities had already developed a kind of 
“modern character”; but in the rural area, it still remained almost the same as former 
dynasties.  
 
This dual economy did not causally relate to the incapability of the Song to have a 
modern style industrialization period. In fact, several successful modern examples of 
industrialization were realized in the condition of a dual economy. The problem of a 
dual economy in Southern Song Dynasty is that the proto-industrialization was in the 
rural areas, where the state decided to retain the same control as former dynasties. 
Although the state facilitated production via spreading technologies and providing 
loans to the households in the rural area, the tax that the state levied in the rural area 
also robustly increased in this dynasty. The backwardness of the two tax system in 
Southern Song is that the taxes were collected from every rural household by the 
means of textiles. The result was that every household, which was the basic 
production unit of the textile industry, needed to finish a certain amount of 
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manufacture task for the state, but not for their own profit. In Song Dynasty, because 
of the serious fiscal crisis, this kind of obligation became heavier than former 
dynasties. It means the labour that rural households input in the production for the 
state increased. Hence, the absolute majority of laborers could only work for their 
own families, albeit the demographic mobility in Southern Song Dynasty was higher 
than former united dynasties. With such a strong state’s intervention, domestic 
systems became the best way for rural households to simultaneously achieve 
manufacturing efficiency and meet the state’s demand.  Throughout the Southern 
Song Dynasty, domestic system was dominant in rural areas. If taking its existence in 
the Northern Song into consideration, the domestic system existed around 300 years 
before the collapse of Southern Song. During these three centuries, the domestic 
system experienced improvement, mainly via deepening of labor division. The 
above-mentioned emergence of middle men was an exceptional example. What needs 
to be noted is that the middle men’s work was to connect the production and the 
market via trade and loan, whereas the production process was seldom involved into.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Compared to the clothier in the British (English) case the middle men are traders, 
rather than entrepreneurs. The households owning machines performed more like 
factories or workshop owners, but usually the number of machines they possessed and 
the labor they employed was much smaller than the British (English) case. Moreover, 
although historians gave high praise to the birth of household owning machines in 
Song Dynasty, they also admit that the number of this kind of household was quite 
small and most of them were in urban areas. It means that household owning 
machines could only cover a minimal portion of textile production in Southern                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Song Dynasty. In short, no matter their role in the production process or their 
influence on the textile production in general, both the middle men and household 
owning machines could not perform the same function as the clothier in the British 
case, let alone as those Arkwright-like entrepreneurs who owned factories at the end 
of proto-industrialization era. 
 
In conclusion, it seems like that there was an equilibium of organizational change in 
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Southern Song. For most manufacturing bodies, the domestic system became the 
optimal choice and the incentive to attempt other production modes was marginal. 
What happened after the establishment of the domestic system in Southern Song was 
only the deepening of a division of labor. Hence, the production mode stagnated as 
scattered, small and with a lack of regulation. In such a condition, although the 
advanced machinery was invented in Southern Song, it could not be popularly applied 
throughout the country since small, scattered workshops could not afford the cost of 
these machines. In addition, there is another fact that needs to be noted. In Southern 
Song, the division of labor and the mechanization degree in the government-run 
workshop was comparable with the factory in the initial phase of British Industrial 
Revolution. However, this kind of manufacturing organization was not profit-driven, 
and they normally only served for the luxury consumption of court and high level 
officials who usually did not take the cost into the consideration. In this sense, the 
government-run workshop could not be seen as a factory like Arkwright established in 
Cromford. In fact, because this non-profit-driven system needed large inputs of 
capital by the state, the number of these workshops was extremely limited. In 
Southern Song, these workshops were mainly near the Hangzhou, where the court was 
located.  
 
Therefore, the divergence appeared: at the end of the British (English) 
proto-industrialization, Britain (England) had already made the three prerequisites for 
the coming Industrial Revolution in textile industry: expansion of market, invention of 
technology and innovation of organization. By contrast, Southern Song only achieved 
two aspects: relative liberalization of the market and nationwide application of 
advanced machinery. The organizational change lags far behind the progress made in 
these two aspects. The further development of the textile industry in China was 
profoundly constrained by this unbalanced structure. 
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5. Conclusion: 
 
Finishing the analyses on the two cases, I will finish with a comparison. First, let us 
summarize the findings in the aforementioned descriptions and analysis. The core part 
of this paper is the third and fourth sections. Generally speaking, the third part 
describes the internal changes of the textile industry in the proto-industrialization era. 
During that period, British textiles were characterized by the booming of wool textiles, 
with the cotton industry emerging at the end of the Industrial Revolution, which was 
characterized by a factory system (from an organizational point of view). 
Proto-industrialization in the wool textile industry started in the rural wood-pasture 
regions in England, where the Crown’s monopoly via the guild system was weak. In 
the seventeenth century, the wool textile industry was developing in the countryside 
while mercantilism prevailed in the government. The decline of the Crown’s 
monopoly over the market and patents, together with mercantilism, increased the 
power of emerging wool textile interests in parliament, especially in the House of 
Commons. In such conditions, the state endowed wool textile manufacturing with 
protection via the means of war against Holland and a ban on Asian textiles, etc. 
Moreover, the decline of the guild’s monopoly increased the possibility of capital 
inflows into rural areas. Thus, with expansion of the market, especially the foreign, 
and the decline of those institutional factors that generated high transition costs, the 
wool textile industry effectuated import-substitution. In this process, domestic wool 
textile production was developed and established itself as the typical production 
pattern for the whole textile sector. Under the influence of the wool textile industry, 
the latecomer – the cotton industry, which was not an indigenous industry in the 
British Isles - rose to its legendary status today. In its infancy, the cotton industry did 
face threats from wool textile interests and Asian textiles. However, through 
parliamentary movements in which wool textile interests participated, the state’s 
monopoly was much weaker than at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when 
rural wool textile industry was in its infancy. Moreover, the cotton industry also 
received protection because of wool interests’ struggle against the East India 
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Company in parliament. Therefore, compared to when the wool textile industry 
emerged in the wood-pasture region, the institutional environment for the infant 
cotton industry was much better. The relative liberal institutional environment later on 
rendered organizational change possible. Through the brave attempts by new 
entrepreneurs, the factory system was established for the cotton industry. This 
successful attempt largely reduced the transition costs that the domestic system 
needed and thus, on the eve of Industrial Revolution, the cotton industry rose up due 
to modern production patterns.  
 
The Southern Song situation is quite another story. Migration from the North urged by 
the war brought advanced technologies to Sichuan and the lower Yangtze River 
regions. Despite losses in the northern territory, the high degree of internal unification 
within the Empire was not reduced. Under such conditions, technologies brought by 
northern migrants spread smoothly throughout the territory. Hence, 
proto-industrialization in the Southern Song case started at a high technological level. 
Moreover, the Southern Song Dynasty was suffering from constant wars and the 
burden of big bureaucracy. Thus it encouraged rural production on the one hand and 
supported commercial activities on the other hand, aiming at enlarging the tax source. 
As a main industrial activity in rural areas, textile manufacturing got state support. 
With the increase of commercial activities, both domestic and foreign markets for the 
rural textile industry got expanded. With these Smithian dynamics, rural textile 
production got specialized in some regions and the division of labor deepened. The 
Chinese domestic system was established in this context. 
 
In the meanwhile, fiscal dilemmas also urged the state to stabilize and expand its 
major income resource – a two-tax system – in rural areas. Because a large portion of 
the two-tax system was paid household by household with textiles, rural households 
needed to directly manufacture textiles for the state. It was hard for them to try other 
production systems which were not built on the foundation of the household. In such 
conditions, the domestic system was the optimal choice that could ensure production 
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efficiency and fulfill state demands at the same time. Hence, although the Southern 
Song dynasty already possessed the technologies that, similar to those that started the 
British Industrial Revolution, allowed the organization of production to remain at the 
domestic level and evolve into a factory-like organization. Finally, the organizational 
changes in the Southern Song region lagged far behind technological and market 
developments. Without suitable organization, high-level technologies scattered in the 
rural area could not sustain development. After the Southern Song era, no Chinese 
dynasty could replicate the Southern Song textile industry’s glory. 
  
Comparing the textile industries in the aforementioned states, we can see that the 
textile industries received both negative and positive influences from their states. The 
Southern Song state did not facilitate the birth of an endogenous factory system 
because it formulated the state’s high efficiency on taxes from households, but it did 
readily facilitate the utilization of new technologies and machines within the empire. 
Up to the early modern era, the British (English) state did not have such an ability to 
disperse new technologies on a large scale. However, through constant reform, it 
readily gave enough space to the private sector to experience both technological and 
organizational changes. More concretely, the Southern Song State was glorious in its 
highly stationary efficiency within the empire, but its textile industry also stagnated 
because of it. This highly stationary efficiency was achieved via the state’s absolute 
power and development of industrial activities could not develop outside of its 
influence. The textile industry finally was limited by the taxation system, which 
directly exposed to the influence of the Court. What makes the Southern Song dynasty 
unique is that the state adopted a very positive attitude to the market and commercial 
activities. Hence, in this dynasty, the Smithian dynamics of textile industry 
development was remarkably strong and it became a very crucial reason for the 
emerging peak of the Chinese textile industry in the Southern Song region. In the 
British case, Britain (England) was weak due to competition from the European 
Continent, as well as internal competition between the Crown and Parliament. But it 
also benefited from the result of this competition. This competition expanded the 
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market, which created Smithian dynamics for the textile industry in Britain (England). 
Also, competition endowed industrial interests with full capabilities to escape from 
the absolute monopoly of the Crown and to try any possible organizational change in 
accordance with their own needs. Finally, both technological and organizational 
improvements enabled the cotton industry to function as a pioneer in the Industrial 
Revolution. We cannot deny that from a market perspective, the Song State performed 
even better than the British (England) state. What created the divergence is that 
Southern Song state aimed for stationary efficiency, whereas the British (English) 
state was shaped through internal and external competition. These two types of states 
developed separately, shaped their textile industry’s own way of development, and led 
to the different fates of the textile industry.  
 
Thus, a great divergence took place between these two cities. With mechanization in 
the factories, Manchester was making a miracle of the cotton industry, which also 
could be regarded as the symbol of the rising British Empire. The spinning machines 
driven by the steam power roared like tigers, ships fully loaded with cloths navigating 
to faraway places, and the prestige of the Empire where the sun never sets was known 
to world. On the other end of the Eurasian continent, Hangzhou continued its 
traditional way of silk production. The fingers of silk weavers were still skillful, the 
design of the silk fabrics still elaborate, but the era of the Silk Road had already ended. 
In the world market, the legend of Chinese silk was finally replaced by British cotton 
textiles. Why Manchester but not Hangzhou? The story is not only about technologies, 
but also about the role of the state in the making of different production systems.  
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